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INTRODUCTION
In the Allegory of the Cave,1 Plato describes a group of
people imprisoned in a cavern. The prisoners are bound by the
neck and legs in such a manner that they can only see the wall
in front of them. Their view of the world is limited to the shadows projected on the wall by objects travelling past the cave entrance. Captives since birth, the residents have never directly
observed the true form of the items casting the shadows. Thus,
appearances, not substance, govern their lives. Judgments
made in this distorted, two-dimensional world would have no
basis in fact. Only those adventurous enough to leave the safety
and security of their virtual world will come to discern the difference between reality and illusion.
This is not to minimize the importance of appearances.
Even outside the cave, appearance and perception often triumph over substance and reality. Wise public officials learn
this lesson early in their career. Abraham Lincoln, for example,
knew that in order to maintain credibility in his personal and
political life he “must not only be chaste but above suspicion.”2
Recognizing that a “universal feeling, whether or not illfounded, cannot be safely disregarded,”3 President Lincoln declined an invitation to discuss a prisoner exchange with the
Confederacy fearing that the meeting would compromise the
Union’s war effort by giving the appearance of a peace negotiation.4 Less astute leaders learn that perception trumps substance the hard way. After losing the first-ever televised presidential debate because of his less-than-photogenic appearance
(especially compared to the adroitly coffered, tanned John Kennedy), Richard Nixon candidly admitted that in preparing for
the debate he should have spent more time on appearances and
less on substance.5
1. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 253–61 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Vintage
Books 1991).
2. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William B. Warren and Others (Apr.
7, 1849), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 41, 41 (Roy P.
Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS] (“In relation to these
pledges, I must not only be chaste but above suspicion.”); see also Abraham
Lincoln, Remarks to a Pennsylvania Delegation (Jan. 24, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS 179, 180 (“Any man whom I may appoint to such a [Cabinet]
position, must be, as far as possible, like Caesar’s wife, pure and above suspicion . . . .”).
3. President Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854),
in 2 COLLECTED WORKS 247, 256.
4. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 175, 456 (1995).
5. See RICHARD M. NIXON, SIX CRISES 340 (1962) (“I recognized the basic
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Judges, like other public officials, have long been affected
by appearances. Future Supreme Court Justice David Davis,
while serving as a circuit judge in mid-nineteenth century Illinois, made sure that everyone except the clerk and sheriff left
the courtroom before he presided over matters in which he was
a party.6 The failure of Justice Abe Fortas to recognize the importance of appearances resulted in his forced resignation from
the United States Supreme Court.7 Similarly, Judge Clement
Haynsworth’s inattention to public perceptions thwarted his
appointment to the high Court.8 Both Fortas and Haynsworth
learned too late that “[i]n matters of ethics, appearance and reality often converge as one.”9
Presidents, judges, and other public officials are not the only ones who are prudent to avoid bad appearances. Saint Paul
advised the Thessalonians to “[a]bstain from the appearance of
evil.”10 Caesar held his wife to a “beyond reproach”11 standard,
and the Idaho Supreme Court cautioned husbands and wives
that they must “conduct themselves that each may be above
suspicion from the other.”12 Doctors,13 teachers,14 sports figmistake I had made. I had concentrated too much on substance and not
enough on appearance.”).
6. See HENRY CLAY WHITNEY, LIFE ON THE CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN 81–
82 (1940) (describing how Judge Davis would enter default judgments against
defendants he had sued). Of course, even in Davis’s time it was improper for a
judge to preside over a matter in which the judge was a party. See Trs. of Ill. &
Mich. Canal v. Brainard, 12 Ill. 487, 516 (1851) (Caton, J., dissenting) (“[A]
law which makes a man a judge in his own case, is abhorrent to the first principles of natural justice . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own
cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”).
7. See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
8. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
9. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 565 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
10. 1 Thessalonians 5:22 (King James).
11. Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1146 n.101 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(“[W]hen Julius Caesar was asked why he chose to divorce his wife after a
false accusation of adultery, Caesar’s laconic answer is said to have been that
‘Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion,’ or as it is usually rendered, ‘Caesar’s
wife must be above reproach.’” (citing PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH’S LIVES 206 (Arthur Hugh Clough ed., John Dryden trans., 1963))).
12. Spofford v. Spofford, 108 P. 1054, 1055 (Idaho 1910).
13. See Peter Benesh, GAO Report Might Stir More Changes in Drug Ads,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 8, 2007, at A8 (reporting that some clinics, hospitals, and doctors avoid the appearance of impropriety by refusing “perks”
from pharmaceutical companies).
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ures,15 journalists,16 television performers,17 law school officials,18 and professional wrestlers19 are often judged by the
public under an appearance of impropriety standard. Judges,
however, are not only liable to suffer popular disfavor for failing to avoid improper appearances, but are also subject to discipline for creating a perception of wrongdoing even where no
actual misconduct occurs. Although it has been suggested that
“[o]nly mothers are divinely capable of judiciously using the
appearance of impropriety to judge someone” and that “[m]ere
mortals should stick to facts,”20 punishing judges for appearing
to violate an ethical rule began with the first American Bar As14. See Laura Diamond & Carroll Rogers, Doctor Bolsters Flowe’s Account,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 20, 2006, at D5 (“Teachers and school administrators
should avoid even the appearance of impropriety . . . .”).
15. See James Allen, Ex-Pats Star Suspended, TIMES UNION, Apr. 26,
2008, http://www.timesunion.com/ASPStories/Story.asp?newsdate=12/24/2009&
navigation=nextprior&category=SPORTS&storyID=683958 (reporting the suspension of a college basketball player for creating an appearance of impropriety
by having another student complete part of his course work); Andy Staples,
SEC May Discuss Background Checks, TAMPA TRIB., July 26, 2007, http://
www2.tbo.com/content/2007/jul/26/sp-sec-may-discuss-backgroundchecks/ (“[T]o
eliminate the appearance of impropriety, officials [of sporting events] aren’t
allowed to work games involving their alma maters or their former coaches.”);
Jim Thomas, This Season Down to the Joy of Six, DAILY NEWS L.A., Nov. 14,
2007, at C4, available at 2007 WLNR 22764222 (“The appearance of impropriety should be avoided as much as possible, especially in a sport as wildly
emotional as college football can be.”).
16. See Robert D. Richards, Editorial, For Wine Reviewers, Freebies and
Ethics Go Nose to Nose, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 9, 2004, at B5, available at
2004 WLNR 20783700 (“Journalists early in their careers learn the importance of remaining neutral, removing conflicts of interest and avoiding even
the appearance of impropriety.”); Anthony Violanti, Sound Ethics Make for
Good Journalism, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 31, 2003, at C4, available at 2003
WLNR 2185765 (“Journalists must recognize that they must avoid the appearance of impropriety.”).
17. See Richard Rushfield, ‘Idol’ Singer Disqualified, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2009, at E2 (reporting that a performer was removed from the list of finalists
in a talent competition in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety).
18. See STATE OF ILL. ADMISSION REVIEW COMM., REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 30 (2009), available at http://www2.illinois.gov/admissionsreview/
Documents/FinalReport.pdf (holding University of Illinois College of Law officials to an appearance of impropriety standard).
19. See Steve Anderson, Feature: Steve Anderson’s End of the Week
Ramblings (Sept. 19, 2008), http://wwe-news.hackd.org/7978-a-Feature-Steve
-Andersons-End-of-the-Week-Ramblings.html (criticizing professional wrestler, Jeff Hardy, for creating an “appearance of impropriety” by attempting to
board an airplane while seemingly intoxicated).
20. Jim Crawford, Letter to the Editor, Alaskans Shouldn’t Get Snookered
When Considering Young, Stevens, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 9, 2007, at
H3.
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sociation (ABA) model code of judicial ethics enacted in 1924.21
The ABA reaffirmed the disciplinary rule in its most recent
Model Code of Judicial Conduct: “A judge shall act at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”22
No one questions the utility of the appearance of impropriety standard when employed as an aspirational guide. The
reputation of a judge and the judiciary as a whole is enhanced
by circumspect conduct on and off the bench. The divisive issue
within the judicial ethics community is whether a violation of
the standard is sufficient to form an independent basis for disciplining a judge. Some hail the use of the appearance of impropriety for disciplinary purposes as the only effective means
to maintain public confidence in the judicial system.23 Others
characterize the rule as “unbelievably ambiguous”24 and “susceptible to great abuse and thus potentially dangerous to judicial legitimacy.”25
This Article examines the disciplinary use of the appearance of impropriety standard from a theoretical and practical
standpoint. Part I begins with a review of the events which
convinced the ABA to enact the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics
(1924 Canons) and to marquee the appearance of impropriety
as the cornerstone of the first judicial code. Part I then continues by tracing the refinement of the appearance standard
through successor ABA Codes, including the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct (1972 Code), the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Con21. See CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924).
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007) (emphasis added).
23. For a comprehensive argument in support of the appearance of impropriety standard, see Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety:
With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
63 (2005); see also Nancy J. Moore, Is the Appearance of Impropriety an Appropriate Standard for Disciplining Judges in the Twenty-First Century?, 41
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 295–300 (2010) (arguing in favor of maintaining the appearance of impropriety prohibition as a disciplinary standard).
24. Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal
Judges: Hearings on S. 1097 and S. 2109 Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 175 (1969) (statement
of Justice Tom C. Clark, U.S. Supreme Court, retired); see also Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial Confirmation
Hearings, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 47 (2006), http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/Faculty/Siegel_Questioning_Justice.pdf (“The idea of an ‘appearance of impropriety’ is inherently vague . . . .”).
25. Gregory C. Pingree, Where Lies the Emperor’s Robe? An Inquiry into
the Problem of Judicial Legitimacy, 86 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1128 (2007).
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duct (1990 Code), and the 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(2007 Code). Part II critically reviews the most debated aspect
of the appearance prohibition—whether the admittedly imprecise rule can withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge. A costbenefit analysis is conducted in Part III, weighing the purported advantages against the chilling effect of a disciplinary
system based on perceptions. Suggested solutions to the problems inherent in any disciplinary system which treats virtual
reality the same as reality are presented in Part IV and include
(1) jettisoning the use of the appearance of impropriety standard for disciplinary purposes, (2) replacing the vague test with
rules specifically defining prohibited acts, and (3) placing a limiting construction on the term “appearance of impropriety” thereby supplying sufficient specificity to permit the ambiguous
standard to survive a due process challenge. The Article concludes by acknowledging the painfully obvious—the appearance
of impropriety standard is not really a standard at all; it only
appears to be a standard.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY STANDARD
Saint Paul’s appeal to the Thessalonians to “[a]bstain from
the appearance of evil”26 served as the precursor to the modern
ethical mandate that judges must avoid any behavior which, in
fact or perception, reflects adversely on the judge or judiciary.
Citing Paul,27 early courts announced that “[t]o keep the fountain of justice pure and above reproach, the very appearance of
evil should be avoided”28 by jurors,29 lawyers,30 litigants,31 wit26. 1 Thessalonians 5:22 (King James).
27. See, e.g., In re Harriss, 4 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Ill. 1936) (“[The 1924 Canons] were all succinctly summed up by St. Paul centuries ago when he advised the Thessalonians to abstain from all appearance of evil.”); Gantt v.
Brown, 134 S.W. 571, 571 (Mo. 1911) (“[Y]et we can with profit heed Paul’s
admonition: Abstain from all appearance of evil.”).
28. Eastham v. Holt, 27 S.E. 883, 894 (W. Va. 1897); see also State ex rel.
Attorney Gen. v. Lazarus, 1 So. 361, 376 (La. 1887) (“All those who minister in
the temple of justice . . . should be above reproach and suspicion. None should
serve at its altar whose conduct is at variance with his obligations.”).
29. See Bonnett v. Glatfeldt, 11 N.E. 250, 253–54 (Ill. 1887) (suggesting
that a juror created an appearance of evil by accepting a ride home from the
plaintiff ); Ayrhart v. Wilhelmy, 112 N.W. 782, 783 (Iowa 1907) (“[Jurors]
should be careful not only to avoid actual impropriety, but to keep themselves
clear of the very appearance of evil . . . .”); Bradbury v. Cony, 62 Me. 223, 225
(1873) (“In the trial of a cause the appearance of evil should be as much
avoided as evil itself. It is important that jurymen . . . should be free from the
suspicion of prejudice.”).
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nesses,32 and judges.33 Thus, it was no surprise that after substituting the secular term “impropriety” for the theological reference to “evil,” Paul’s exhortation became part of the ABA’s
first Canons of Judicial Ethics. But it would take the actions of
someone less saintly34 than Paul to convince the ABA that the
time had arrived not only to impose an appearance standard on
judges, but to make appearances the centerpiece of the rules
governing judicial conduct.
A. JUDGE KENESAW MOUNTAIN LANDIS AND THE 1924 CANONS
OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
The 1924 Canons repeatedly reminded judges to avoid the
appearance of impropriety in all professional and personal activities.35 This preoccupation with the need to avoid even the
suspicion of improper conduct is explained by the nature of the
force that compelled the enactment of the first ABA model judicial code. That force was the hard-hitting, no-nonsense, callthem-as-you-see-them federal district court judge, Kenesaw
Mountain Landis.36 Judge Landis was appointed the first com30. See In re Duncan, 42 S.E. 433, 441 (S.C. 1902) (warning young lawyers
to avoid the appearance of evil); see also ABA Comm. on Prof ’l Ethics, Formal
Op. 49 (1931) (“If the [legal] profession is to occupy that position in public esteem which will enable it to be of the greatest usefulness, it must avoid not
only all evil but must likewise avoid the appearance of evil.”).
31. See Omaha Fair & Exposition Ass’n v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 60 N.W. 330,
332 (Neb. 1894) (“[P]arties, counsel, witnesses, and all other persons should be
extremely careful to avoid evil, and the appearance of evil . . . .”).
32. See id.
33. See In re Davis, 15 Haw. 377, 390 (1904) (Galbraith, J., dissenting)
(“‘The law carefully guards not only against actual abuse, but even against the
appearance of evil, from which doubt can justly be cast upon the impartiality
of judges . . . .’” (citing In re Dodge & Stevenson Mfg. Co., 77 N.Y. 101, 110
(1879))); Dorlon v. Lewis, 9 How. Pr. 1, 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851) (“A referee
. . . should not only avoid all improper influences, but even ‘the appearance of
evil.’”).
34. See James Kirby, The Year They Fixed the World Series, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1988, at 65, 69 (“[Judge] Landis is widely regarded as a savior [of baseball]—though not a saint . . . .”); see also discussion infra Part I.A.
35. See infra Part I.B (discussing the provisions of the 1924 Canons).
36. Judge Landis was named after Kennesaw Mountain near Atlanta,
Georgia, where his father was wounded during the Civil War. Landis the “Big
Umpire”: Judge Accepts Baseball Job; Stays on Bench, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
Nov.13, 1920, at 1. The judge’s headline-grabbing exploits while on the federal
bench are well documented. See, e.g., Mitchell Nathanson, The Sovereign Nation of Baseball: Why Federal Law Does Not Apply to “America’s Game” and
How it Got That Way, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 49, 68 (2009) (noting Landis’s then-record-setting fine of over $29,000,000 against Standard Oil for antitrust violations, his attempt to exercise jurisdiction over Kaiser Wilhelm I,
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missioner of major league baseball in November 1920,37 in order to combat gambling and bribery influences that many
thought were corrupting the national pastime.38 The Commissioner’s job was simple: to use whatever means necessary “to
bring to book anyone connected with baseball in any capacity,
from ‘magnate’ to bat boy, who is suspected of conduct or associations detrimental to the best interests of the sport.”39 In other words, Judge Landis was to “keep the sport above reproach.”40 In restoring the public’s faith in baseball’s integrity,
“Landis planned on eliminating not only evil, but also the appearance of evil from the game.”41 The judge put his plan into
action by barring for life the eight Chicago White Sox team
members accused of fixing the 1919 World Series, notwithstanding the fact that each had been previously acquitted of the
underlying criminal charges.42
and his overall reputation as a “hanging judge”).
37. See DAVID PIETRUSZA, JUDGE AND JURY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
JUDGE KENESAW MOUNTAIN LANDIS 169–72 (1998) (describing the meeting
with baseball club owners in which Landis accepted the commissionership); J.
G. TAYLOR SPINK, JUDGE LANDIS AND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BASEBALL 71–
73 (1974).
38. See ELIOT ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND THE 1919
WORLD SERIES 13–15, 197–200 (1963); G. EDWARD WHITE, CREATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL TRANSFORMS ITSELF 1903–1953, at 85–92 (1996)
(describing the connection between gambling and player corruption in the early twentieth century); FRAN ZIMNIUCH, CROOKED: A HISTORY OF CHEATING IN
SPORTS 19–20 (2009) (describing baseball bribery scandals in the late nineteenth century).
39. I.E. Sanborn, Major Operation on B.B. Fabric to Restore Game, CHI.
DAILY TRIB., Dec. 8, 1920, at 23.
40. SPINK, supra note 37, at 76 (quoting SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 20, 1921);
see also WHITE, supra note 38, at 110 (“During his twenty-three years as commissioner Landis consistently attempted to keep baseball ‘above reproach’ . . . .”); Daniel A. Nathan, The Big Fix: Arnold Rothstein Rigged the
1919 World Series. Or Did He?, LEGAL AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2004, http://www.legal
affairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/review_nathan_marapr04.msp (“Landis . . . was hired . . . to lend the game moral authority, stability, and the appearance of integrity.”).
41. Jason M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner
“Best Interests” Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1645, 1652 (1999); see Robert I. Lockwood, The Best Interests of the
League: Referee Betting Scandal Brings Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Frontcourt in the NBA, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 137,
141–42 (2008) (“Landis believed that he had a mandate . . . to assure that
baseball did not even have the appearance of impropriety.”); Full Cry After the
Crooks, SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 20, 1921, at 4 (“The [baseball] player must
avoid even the appearance of evil and so conduct himself at all times he will be
above reproach and suspicion.”).
42. See PIETRUSZA, supra note 37, at 186–88.
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As Judge Landis was being proclaimed a “national hero”
and “guardian of public virtue” for his efforts to clean up baseball,43 he received harsh criticism from lawyers for tarnishing
the image of the judiciary by retaining his federal judgeship
while serving as Commissioner.44 His detractors, however, were
unable to identify any law or ethics rule barring Judge Landis
from simultaneously holding both public and private employments.45 After investigating the Landis matter, United States
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer reported that: “There
seems to be nothing as a matter of general law which would
prohibit a district judge from receiving additional compensation
for other than strictly judicial service, such as acting as arbitrator or commissioner.”46
The Attorney General further concluded that although
Judge Landis might be disqualified from presiding over matters
involving major league baseball, that fact did not affect his
right to serve as a judge.47 Nor was there any evidence that
Landis’s baseball duties interfered with the timely performance
of his judicial duties.48
The absence of any identifiable misdeed did not deter the
ABA from heaping its “unqualified condemnation” upon Landis
in the form of a resolution censuring the judge for maintaining
dual employment.49 Because Judge Landis violated no law or rule
of conduct, the censure, by necessity, was based on an appearance
of impropriety. As a result, the censure spoke in generalities describing the judge’s service as Commissioner “as conduct un43. Id. at 188.
44. See id. at 196 (describing Chicago attorney Thomas J. Sutherland’s
criticism of Judge Landis).
45. See Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the
ABA Model Code: The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 273 (2007)
(“No law or ethical precept barred Judge Landis’s activity.”).
46. PIETRUSZA, supra note 37, at 197. One of Judge Landis’s severest critics, Congressman Benjamin Franklin Welty, introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives on February 11, 1921, which would have prohibited federal
judges from accepting outside salaries. See id. The bill was defeated in the Senate
by a tie vote. See Bill Aimed at Landis Fails, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1921, at 13.
47. See PIETRUSZA, supra note 37, at 197.
48. During his attempt to obtain a bill of impeachment against Judge
Landis, Congressman Welty was asked: “Have you any proof that Judge Landis has neglected the duties of his court?” “I have not,” was Welty’s reply. Id.
at 202–03.
49. REPORT OF THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 61–68 (1921); Bar Meeting Votes Censure of Landis, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1921, at 1 (reproducing the ABA resolution censuring Judge
Landis).
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worthy of the office of judge, derogatory to the dignity of the
Bench, and undermining public confidence in the independence
of the judiciary.”50 So, just as Judge Landis punished the eight
acquitted White Sox players for appearances detrimental to
baseball, the ABA sanctioned Landis for appearances detrimental to the judicial system.51
Without question, the Landis affair renewed the ABA’s interest in enacting a judicial code of ethics.52 Interestingly, however, the drafters of the first judicial code did not see fit to prohibit the precise conduct which led to the condemnation of
Landis. The 1924 Canons did not bar a judge from receiving
compensation for nonjudicial services. To the contrary, Canon
31 permitted a judge to serve as an arbitrator, teacher, or writer so long as the secondary employment did not interfere with
the performance of judicial duties.53 The Canons also permitted
certain judges to maintain a private law practice.54 Instead of
50. REPORT OF THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 49, at 61; Bar Meeting Votes Censure of Landis,
supra note 49.
51. It is open to question whether Judge Landis’s simultaneous employments actually harmed public confidence in the judiciary. The ABA thought
that it did. Others held a contrary view. See, e.g., SPINK, supra note 37, at 74
(“[T]he entire country felt pleased and gratified with the selection of Landis as
[baseball commissioner].”); Geo. W. Hall, Letter to the Editor, Judge Landis
and the American Bar Association, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 5, 1921, at 6
(“What the public wants is results and not mere ethical theories, and we challenge the [ABA] to show us another United States judge whose services have
been of greater public benefit than those of Judge Landis.”); Landis Quits
Bench for Baseball Job; Boomed for Mayor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1922, at 1
(“[T]hough a mighty courageous man is lost to the bench, but Judge Landis
should be drafted for the Mayoralty. He is one man to clean up Chicago.”
(quoting Judge Scanlan of the Criminal Court of Cook County)); Olson Condemns “Lynching” of Landis by Bar, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 7, 1921, at 17
(“Just a word to let you [Landis] know that I do not approve of the lynching of
your character by the [ABA]. . . . If more judges had your character and courage,
the country would be better served than it often is now.” (quoting a letter from
Chief Justice Harry Olson to Judge Landis)).
52. See JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 180 (1974)
(“[I]t was baseball’s ‘Black Sox’ scandal of the 1919 World Series that fathered
the first Canons of Judicial Ethics.”); Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of
Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593, 598
(1992) (“[T]he Landis matter induced the ABA to take action to bolster public
confidence in the judiciary; the ABA responded in 1924 by issuing its Canons
of Judicial Ethics.”); Cara Lee Neville, Discussing the Judicial Code Is Like
Discussing Religion, JUDGES’ J., Summer 2007, at 37, 37 (stating that the ABA
formed a committee to draft the 1924 Canons as a result of Landis’s appointment as Commissioner of Baseball).
53. See CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 31 (1924).
54. See id.
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outlawing the specific conduct that the ABA considered unconscionable, the drafters of the 1924 Canons opted to prohibit bad
appearances. Placing the appearance of impropriety on the
same plane as actual impropriety would not face serious opposition for eighty-three years.
B. THE 1924 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
The ABA’s concern that Judge Landis’s conduct created an
appearance of impropriety spawned the paramount mission of
the 1924 Canons—to encourage judges to avoid any professional or personal conduct that could be perceived to damage the
ideal image of a judge as an impartial decisionmaker and model
citizen. Canon 4 of the 1924 Canons, entitled “Avoidance of Impropriety,” reflected this overarching principal by advising that
“[a] judge’s official conduct should be free from impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety” and a judge’s personal behavior
“should be beyond reproach.”55 The focus on public impressions,
perceptions, and suspicions continued throughout the first judicial code. For example, the Canons cautioned judges not to (1)
permit the impression that any person could improperly influence the judge,56 (2) incur any pecuniary or other obligation
which appeared to interfere with the proper administration of
justice,57 or (3) give any ground for a reasonable suspicion that
the judicial office was being used to promote a business or charitable enterprise.58 Judges were further warned against business or investment relationships that “tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias [the judge’s] judgment”59
and to avoid business and social associations that “may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that [such] relations or
friendships” influenced judicial actions.60 Similarly, Canon 27
required that a judge forego any fiduciary appointment that interfered or seemed to interfere with the proper performance of
55. Id. Canon 4.
56. See id. Canon 13.
57. See id. Canon 24 (“[A judge] should not accept inconsistent duties; nor
incur obligations, pecuniary or otherwise, which will in any way interfere or
appear to interfere with his devotion to the expeditious and proper administration of his official functions.”).
58. See id. Canon 25 (“[A judge] should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either to the success of private business ventures, or to charitable enterprises.”).
59. Id. Canon 26.
60. Id. Canon 33.
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official duties.61 Political activities were severely limited because “it is inevitable that suspicion of being warped by political bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active promoter
of the interests of one political party as against another.”62 Canon 31 admonished judges that maintained a private law practice to avoid conduct which utilized or appeared to utilize the
judicial office to further his law practice.63 And in case the casual reader forgot the admonishment of Canon 4, Canon 34 once
again reminded judges that in every particular a judge’s life
should be “above reproach.”64
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Robert Shaw captured the
sentiments of Saint Paul, the critics of Judge Landis, and the
drafters of the inaugural code of judicial conduct when he observed that the 1924 Canons did no more than caution judges
to “abstain from all appearance of evil.”65
C. THE 1972 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The 1924 Canons remained essentially dormant until
1969.66 In that year the ABA created a committee to review and
reinforce the Canons in response to another controversy arising
from a federal judge’s receipt of extrajudicial income. This time
the misfortune befell Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas.
1. The Fortas Scandal: Giving New Importance to
Appearances
Pursuant to an agreement with the Wolfson Family Foundation, Justice Fortas was to receive a fee of $20,00067 as com61. See id. Canon 27.
62. Id. Canon 28. The 1924 Canons prohibited a judge from making political speeches, making or soliciting contributions or assessments to a political
party, endorsing candidates, participating in party conventions, acting as a
party leader or officer, or otherwise engaging in political activities. See id. A
judge was required to resign before becoming a candidate for a nonjudicial office. See id. Canon 30. A judge running for reelection or a new judicial office
was directed to refrain from all campaign conduct that “might tend to arouse
reasonable suspicion that he is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his candidacy or the success of his party.” Id.
63. See id. Canon 31.
64. Id. Canon 34.
65. In re Harriss, 4 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Ill. 1936).
66. Minor amendments were made to the 1924 Canons between 1933 and
1964. See LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE
131–43 (1992).
67. See Jake Garn & Lincoln C. Oliphant, Disqualification of Federal
Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): Some Observations On and Objections to an
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pensation for his help in planning the charitable, educational,
and civil rights activities of the Foundation.68 At the time Fortas received the $20,000 payment, the Foundation’s director,
Louis Wolfson, was under investigation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.69 Only after the indictment of Wolfson
for selling unregistered stock70 did Justice Fortas return the
consulting fee and cancel the agreement.71 Although the Justice
violated no law,72 he could not “shake the appearance of wrong
doing.”73 As far as the press was concerned, appearances were
all that mattered.
Time magazine reported that the question of whether Fortas committed a crime “misses the point” because Fortas’s conduct raised “a question about the appearance of virtue on the
court.”74 In the article that broke the Fortas story, Life magazine reproduced verbatim Canon 4 of the 1924 Canons which
required a judge to be free from the appearance of impropriety
and to conduct his everyday life “beyond reproach.”75 The Life
article also quoted the text of Canon 24 directing a judge not to
incur pecuniary obligations which “appear to interfere with his
devotion to the expeditious and proper administration of his
official functions.”76 The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
agreed with the magazines’ assessments and found Fortas’s
Attempt by the United States Department of Justice to Disqualify a Judge on
the Basis of His Religion and Church Position, 4 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 22
(1981).
68. See id.; see also William Lambert, Fortas of the Supreme Court: A
Question of Ethics: The Justice . . . and the Stock Manipulator, LIFE, May 9,
1969, at 32, 33 (“Ostensibly, Justice Fortas was being paid to advise the foundation on ways to use its funds for charitable, educational and civil rights
projects.”).
69. See Garn & Oliphant, supra note 67.
70. See No Peace for Fortas, TIME, May 9, 1969, at 28, 28.
71. Id.; see also Peter W. Bowie, The Last 100 Years: An Era of Expanding
Appearances, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 911, 928 (2007).
72. John Anthony Maltese, The Selling of Clement Haynsworth: Politics
and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 72 JUDICATURE 338, 340
(1989) (“Fortas had broken no law . . . .”); The Fortas Affair, TIME, May 16,
1969, at 20 (“Although Fortas had not broken any law, he had clearly been
guilty of a gross indiscretion.”).
73. Maltese, supra note 72, at 340–41.
74. Judgment on a Justice, TIME, May 23, 1969, at 23 (quoting Stanford
law professor Gerald Gunther).
75. Lambert, supra note 68, at 36; see also Editorial, Fortas Should Resign, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 1969, at 16 (quoting Canon 4 of the 1924 Canons and
criticizing Fortas’ “insensitivity to ethical considerations in a position where,
like Caesar’s wife, he must be beyond reproach”).
76. Lambert, supra note 68, at 36.

1928

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[94:1914

conduct “clearly contrary to the Canons of Judicial Ethics.”77
The ABA Committee’s informal opinion censuring Judge Fortas
mentioned eight Canons, “but the one most forcefully cited was
Canon Four’s command that ‘a judge’s official conduct should
be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.’”78
Justice Fortas “bowed to the iron rule that a judge must be
beyond suspicion”79 and resigned from the Supreme Court on
May 16, 1969.80
The scandal convinced the ABA to create a committee,
headed by retiring California Chief Justice Roger Traynor, to
revise and strengthen the 1924 Canons.81 With the Fortas resignation still reverberating, the Traynor Committee promoted
the prohibition against improper appearances from the text of
old Canon 4 to the title of Canon 2 of the new 1972 Code.82 Canon 2’s title advised that “A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety
and the Appearance of Impropriety in all His Activities.”83 The
1972 Code also upgraded the appearance standard from the
purely aspirational purpose it was meant to serve under the
1924 Canons to an enforceable rule of judicial conduct.84
But, the 1972 Code’s major contribution to the developing
world of judicial ethics was to graft the appearance of impropriety standard onto the rules governing judicial disqualification. Once again a perceived conflict between a judge’s official duties and his personal finances would lead the Traynor Committee
to dramatically restructure disqualification rules. Henceforth,
77. 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES
AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1463 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997) [hereinafter THE JUSTICES]; see also Glen Elsasser, Fortas Violated Judicial Ethics,
ABA Rules, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1969, at 28 (describing the informal opinion

issued by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics finding that Fortas violated the 1924 Canons).
78. THE JUSTICES, supra note 77, at 1463–64.
79. Mr. Fortas Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1969, at 46.
80. THE JUSTICES, supra note 77, at 1464.
81. See Garn & Oliphant, supra note 67, at 23 (noting that the ABA’s appointment of a special committee to revise the Canons of Judicial Ethics was
“[m]otivated in part by the Fortas scandal”).
82. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972). The Code of Judicial
Conduct was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on August 16, 1972. MILORD, supra note 66, at 109.
83. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972).
84. Charles Gardner Geyh, Roscoe Pound and the Future of the Good Government Movement, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 871, 879 (2007) (“The 1972 Code thus
effectively strengthened the commitment to regulating appearances as a
means to promote public confidence in the courts by making its rules enforceable.”).
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disqualification would be required any time a judge’s participation in a matter created an “appearance” of partiality.
2. Judge Haynsworth, Appearances, and Judicial
Disqualification
Immediately upon his nomination to fill the Fortas vacancy, Clement Haynsworth, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, faced conflict-of-interest charges. The Senate Judiciary Committee learned that Judge Haynsworth, while holding a one-seventh interest in a vending machine company,
ruled in favor of a customer of the company.85 The judge also
owned stock in several corporations which appeared as litigants
before him.86 While he violated no law, rule of conduct,87 or disqualification statute,88 his “nomination ultimately failed because of the Senate’s sensitivity to the appearance of conflict-ofinterest improprieties after the Fortas defeat.”89 Judge Haynsworth’s perceived impropriety in presiding over matters in
which he had a de minimis or indirect financial interest helped
persuade the Traynor Committee to drastically overhaul the
judicial disqualification rules of the 1924 Canons.90
The 1924 Canons required disqualification in two situations. First, a judge could not “act in a controversy where a

85. Garn & Oliphant, supra note 67, at 23–24.
86. Id.; Maltese, supra note 72, at 341.
87. A Justice Department probe into the financial interests of Judge
Haynsworth disclosed no wrongdoing or “basis for opposing [his] nomination.”
William Kling, Haynsworth Absolved by Justice Dept., CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10,
1969, at 22 (quoting the joint statement of the chair and ranking Republican
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee); see also Maltese, supra note 72,
at 341 (“Haynsworth . . . was guilty of no crime.”).
88. At the time of the Haynsworth nomination, the federal disqualification statute required “disqualification only where a judge had ‘a substantial
interest, had been of counsel, had been a material witness, or was connected to
a party or attorney in a case so as to render it improper ‘in his opinion’ to sit.’”
Winslow v. Lehr, 641 F. Supp. 1237, 1239 (D. Colo. 1986) (quoting Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts: Maintaining an Appearance of Justice Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 863, 867–68 (1978)).
89. NPR Legal Affairs, A History of the Conflict in High Court Appointments,
July 6, 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4732341.
90. Taking Disqualification Seriously, 92 JUDICATURE 12, 14 (2008) (“In
1972, the ABA, responding in part to the Haynesworth [sic] episode, adopted
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which sought to encapsulate the ethics of
disqualification into a unified rule.”). Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Causality Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), also influenced the revision of the
disqualification rules. See E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 61 (1973).
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near relative is a party.”91 Second, the Canons forbade a judge
from “performing . . . any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved.”92 The drafters of the 1972 Code found
these provisions wholly unsatisfactory because of their vagueness and incompleteness.93 To remedy these shortcomings, the
new Code established four specific grounds for disqualification.94 In addition, one general catch-all category of disqualification was created in order to capture unforeseen or marginal
situations posing a threat to public confidence in the judiciary.95 The Fortas and Haynsworth episodes dictated that the
governing principal of judicial disqualification was now to be
appearance based. That principal was embodied in Canon 3C(1)
of the 1972 Code which required disqualification “in a proceeding in which [the judge’s] impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”96
Professor Thode described the intimate relationship between the new disqualification provision and the general appearance of impropriety prohibition:
Any conduct that would lead a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” is a basis for the judge’s disqualification.
Thus, an impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in violation of
Canon 2 that would reasonably lead one to question the judge’s impartiality in a given proceeding clearly falls within the scope of the
general standard, as does participation by the judge in the proceeding
if he thereby creates the appearance of a lack of impartiality.97

Thus, under the 1972 Code appearances governed a judge’s
personal and official behavior and determined which cases the
judge would be permitted to hear. Appearances officially became, and would continue to be, the heart of judicial ethics.
D. THE 1990 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The drafters of the 1990 Code continued in the belief that
the appearance standard served a critical function—“to caution
judges to avoid certain prospective conduct even if the conduct
only appears suspect, and to proscribe any act that is harmful

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 13 (1924).
Id. Canon 29.
THODE, supra note 90, at 60.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(a)–(d) (1972).
Id. Canon 3C(1).
Id.
THODE, supra note 90, at 60–61.
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even if it is not specifically prohibited in the Code.”98 Accordingly, the 1990 Code left the appearance of impropriety rule of the
1972 Code “relatively intact, albeit considerably amplified.”99
The 1990 Code strengthened Canon 2 by substituting “shall”
for “should” in order to eliminate any lingering doubt concerning the mandatory nature of the prohibition.100 Moreover, an
expanded commentary explicitly reminded judges that the rule
applied to both professional and personal conduct of a judge.101
But the most significant amplification of the old code was the
creation of an objective, reasonable person test for judging appearances. The Commentary to Canon 2 of the 1990 Code provided: “[t]he test for appearance of impropriety is whether the
conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the
judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired.”102
With the addition of gender neutral language, the disqualification provision of Canon 3C(1) of the 1972 Code was transferred to Canon 3E(1) of the 1990 Code. Canon 3E(1) continued
the duty to disqualify whenever it appeared that the judge’s
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”103
E. THE 2007 MODEL CODE
In July 2003, the ABA Commission on the 21st Century issued a report detailing thirty-one recommendations designed to
“address and counteract the developments adversely affecting
the fair and impartial administration of justice.”104 One of the
recommendations urged a reexamination of the 1990 Code.105 A
comprehensive review of the Code was suggested in light of the
recent “politicization” of the courts, the Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,106 and the pro98. MILORD, supra note 66, at 13.
99. Id.
100. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990) (“A judge shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.”).
101. Id. cmt.
102. Id.
103. Id. Canon 3E(1).
104. ABA, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, at i (2003) [hereinafter
JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY], available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/
pdf/report.pdf.
105. Id. at 57.
106. 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (expanding the permissible scope of judicial campaign speech).
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liferation of problem-solving courts.107 In response to the report, the president of the ABA created the Joint Commission to
Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Joint Commission).108 Because some members of the Joint Commission questioned the fairness of retaining the admittedly vague appearance of impropriety concept as a disciplinary standard, the
proper role of appearances in judicial ethics was also targeted
for review.109 Members of the Joint Commission would toil for
three and one-half years over whether improper appearances
should remain a basis for judicial discipline or be reassigned to
the status of an unenforceable aspirational guideline. The Joint
Commission’s first attempt to resolve the issue straddled these
two diametrically opposed positions.
1. Preliminary Drafts of Canon 1 of the 2007 Model Code
The May 2004 draft of what was to eventually become Canon 1 of the 2007 Code prominently displayed the appearance
of impropriety prohibition in the text of the Canon: “Conduct in
General: A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance
of Impropriety in All the Judge’s Activities, So as to Uphold the
Integrity, Impartiality, and Independence of the Judiciary.”110
However, the black-letter rules following the Canon did not
mention the appearance of impropriety.111 This omission led
many observers to conclude that the appearance standard was
relegated to a hortatory status and could no longer form the basis of a disciplinary charge.112
The ABA vehemently denied that any change was intended. ABA President Dennis Archer attempted to reassure
critics by announcing that the Joint Commission had retained
the mandatory and disciplinary nature of the standard and did
not transform it into anything less.113 Unconvinced, the oppo107. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 104, at 13–39, 57–58.
108. Mark I. Harrison, The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct:
Blueprint for a Generation of Judges, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 257, 257 (2007).
109. Siobhan Morrissey, Revising the Rules: Update of the Judicial Conduct
Code Will Address the Changing Justice System, 90 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2004, at 62.
110. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (Draft of May
2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/drafts.html.
111. Id. R. 1.01–1.02.
112. See id. R. 1.2; REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 9 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/mcjc-2007.pdf (stating that the appearance of impropriety prohibition was added to Rule 1.2 at the urging of the judiciary and others to establish the appearance of impropriety as an independent basis for discipline).
113. Appearance of Impropriety Issue Continues to Occupy Judicial Code
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nents of the first draft of Canon 1 countered that even accepting President Archer’s assurance, the commentary accompanying Canon 1 unjustifiably precluded the use of the appearance
standard as the sole basis of discipline. The commentary provided that “[o]rdinarily, when a judge is disciplined for engaging in conduct that creates an appearance of impropriety, it will
be in conjunction with charges that the judge violated some
other specific rule under this or another canon.”114 Although
the commentary accurately described the vast majority of judicial disciplinary decisions under the 1972 and 1990 Codes,115
opponents, including the editorial board of the New York Times,
felt that the commentary weakened the appearance standard
by transforming “a crucial ethical mandate into ‘an ancillary
add-on.’”116
A majority of the organizations and individuals that submitted comments to the Joint Commission urged that Canon 1
and the black-letter rules accompanying the Canon be clarified
to ensure that (1) a judge was subject to discipline for conduct
creating an improper appearance, and (2) an appearance of impropriety charge could stand alone without an accompanying
charge citing a more specific rule violation.117
To appease critics, the Joint Commission issued a revised
version of Canon 1 on June 30, 2005. The June draft placed the
prohibition against the appearance of impropriety in the text of
Canon 1 and in disciplinary Rule 1.3.118 The maligned commentary of the March 2004 draft, indicating that ordinarily an appearance of impropriety charge will accompany a specific rule
Panel’s Attention, 20 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF. CONDUCT, June 16, 2004,
at 318 (citing a letter sent by President Archer to Senator Patrick Leahy (DVt.) responding to the Senator’s criticism of the May draft of Canon 1).
114. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 cmt. (2007) (Draft of
May 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/drafts_canon1_
051204_cleanlb.pdf.
115. See infra Part III.B.1.
116. Editorial, Weakening the Rules for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004,
at A16; see also Harrison, supra note 108, at 262 (stating that the code commentary was criticized for “unnecessarily diluting the ‘appearance of impropriety’ standard”).
117. ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2006), available at
http://abanet.org/judicialethics/house_report.pdf (reporting that a majority of
the commentators urged the Joint Commission to retain the appearance of impropriety as a disciplinary standard).
118. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 & R. 1.3 (2007) (Preliminary Draft of June 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
preliminaryreport.html.
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violation, was deleted. By placing the appearance standard in
both the Canon and Rule it became a core code principle and an
independent basis for discipline. Canon 1 remained unchanged
in the next draft of the Code released in December 2005.119
Rule 1.3 also remained intact in the December draft, but was
renumbered as Rule 1.2.120
2. Final Draft of Canon 1 and Rule 1.2 of the 2007 Code
In its Final Report to the ABA House of Delegates, issued
in December 2006,121 the Joint Commission did an about face
on the appearance issue. The drafters decided that a judge
should not be subject to discipline for conduct that did no more
that create a bad impression. To accomplish this reversal, the
Joint Commission simply removed any mention of the appearance of impropriety from the black-letter rules accompanying
Canon 1.122 The fact that the Canon itself retained the admonition against improper appearances was meaningless from a
disciplinary standpoint because the Scope section of the Code
specifically stated that “a judge may be disciplined only for violating a Rule.”123
The demotion of the appearance standard from an enforceable rule to a guiding principle created a small firestorm. The
Conference of Chief Judges communicated its displeasure at
this last-minute retreat,124 one advisor to the Joint Commission

119. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (Final Draft Report of Dec. 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraft
report.html.
120. Id. R. 1.2.
121. ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/house_report.pdf.
122. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 4 (2007).
123. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The section goes on to say that “[w]here a
rule contains a permissive term,” disciplinary action is a matter of discretion.
Id.
124. Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Conference of Chief Justices: “Appearance of Impropriety” Must Remain Enforceable in the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, Feb. 7, 2007, available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/Press
ReleaseAppearanceofImpropriety07.html (reporting that the Conference of
Chief Judges voted to oppose the Joint Commission’s Final Report to the
House of Delegates because of the Commission’s decision to abandon the appearance of impropriety as a basis for judicial discipline). The American Judicature Society also opposed the change. See Editorial, Steps Forward, Steps
Back on Judicial Ethics, JUDICATURE, Nov.–Dec. 2006.
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resigned in protest,125 and the New York Times claimed a
foul.126 In the face of united criticism the Joint Commission relented and supported an amendment introduced on the floor of
the ABA House of Delegates reincorporating the appearance of
impropriety prohibition into disciplinary Rule 1.2.127 The House
of Delegates accepted the amendment by what was described as
a nearly unanimous vote.128 Thus, disciplinary Rule 1.2 of the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the ABA in February 2007 provides: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety.”129
The ABA House appended Comment 5 to Rule 1.2 in an effort to add some precision to the vague rule prohibiting impropriety in fact and appearance. The Comment defines “actual
impropriety” to include “violations of law, court rules or provisions of this Code.”130 This definition, however, is not very helpful because the term “actual impropriety” does not appear in
the disciplinary rule. Instead, Rule 1.2 uses the term “impropriety,” which the Terminology section of the Code defines more
broadly to include “conduct that violates the law, court rules, or
provisions of this Code, and conduct that undermines a judge’s

125. John Caher, Judicial Watchdog Blasts ABA Panel’s Change to Ethics
Rules, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 6, 2007, at 1 (reporting that Robert H. Tembeckjian resigned as an advisor to the Joint Commission because the ABA would make a
“monumental mistake” if it reduced the impropriety and appearance of impropriety provision to an unenforceable guideline).
126. See Editorial, The ABA’s Judicial Ethics Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2007, at A18 (referring to the appearance of impropriety as the “gold standard
of judicial conduct”); Adam Liptak, ABA Panel Would Weaken Code Governing
Judges’ Conduct, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at A14.
127. Harrison, supra note 108, at 262 (“[A]t the urging of the Conference of
Chief Justices and other legal organizations, the Commission accepted an
amendment during the debate in the House of Delegates that reinstated the
duty to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety as part of Canon
1 and as Rule 1.2.”); Charles Toutant, Appearance-of-Impropriety Standard for
Judges Holds Ground in ABA, N.J. L.J., Feb. 19, 2007, at 547 (reporting that
Cynthia Gray, director of the American Judicature’s Center for Judicial Ethics, attributed the Joint Commission’s “about-face” to media coverage and the
Conference of Chief Justices’ support for the appearance standard).
128. James Podgers, Judging Judicial Behavior, 93 A.B.A. J. 61 (2007) (reporting that the ABA House approved returning the appearance of impropriety standard to a disciplinary rule “in a voice vote that sounded close to unanimous”).
129. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007).
130. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 5.
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independence, integrity, or impartiality.”131 “Appearance of impropriety” is ascribed a similar but not identical meaning. According to Comment 5 “[t]he test for appearance of impropriety
is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other
conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.”132 Applying
the definitions found in Comment 5 and in the Terminology
section of the Code to the text of Rule 1.2, it becomes apparent
that the 2007 Code subjects a judge to discipline for (1) violating a law, court rule, or Code provision; (2) conduct that undermines a judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality; and
(3) conduct that a reasonable person views as reflecting adversely on a judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve. This definition of sanctionable conduct is more
verbose, but not more precise, than the mandate of the 1924
Canons that judges should remain “beyond” or “above reproach.”133
II. IS THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY STANDARD
VOID FOR VAGUENESS?
The debate over the appearance of impropriety standard as
a basis for judicial discipline usually centers on the issue of
whether its inherent vagueness violates due process. Opponents assert that the rule is the poster child of statutory imprecision and no judge can be expected to divine when an act
would appear improper to a third party.134
Proponents of the constitutionality of the appearance of
impropriety standard admit that the phrase is “murky,”135 “the
nearest to being hortatory of any provision in the Code,”136 “ex131. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 4.
132. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 5.
133. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canons 4, 34 (1924).
134. See, e.g., Letter from Ronald C. Minkoff, Chair, Ass’n of Prof ’l Responsibility Lawyers, to the Joint Comm’n on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(June 30, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/
comm_rules_minkoff_063004.pdf (stating the Association’s opposition to the
use of the appearance of impropriety standard as a disciplinary rule).
135. ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 31 (2004) (“When
the analysis involves the ‘appearance of impropriety,’ as opposed to actual impropriety, the waters get murky.”).
136. THODE, supra note 90, at 49 (“The black-letter statement of Canon 2 is
very broad in its terms and perhaps the nearest to being hortatory of any provision in the [1972] Code.”).

2010]

THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

1937

tremely broad in scope,”137 and “fraught with subjectivity and
elasticity.”138 Nevertheless, supporters rely on the proposition
that due process demands less precision in rules governing a
particular profession as opposed to criminal laws, or even civil
laws, regulating the conduct of the general public. Advocates of
appearances contend that court cases, ethical codes, and the
judges’ own knowledge of norms within the judicial profession
supply the needed specificity to the otherwise “murky” rule.139
A. VAGUENESS AND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
In order to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge, a statute or rule must (1) give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
warning of the nature of the prohibited conduct, and (2) provide
“explicit standards” for the police, judges, juries, and others
charged with enforcing the enactment.140 It is not necessary
that a regulation “spell out with perfect precision what conduct
it forbids”141 because “[w]ords inevitably contain germs of uncertainty.”142 The degree of specificity that the Constitution requires largely depends upon the nature of the challenged provision.143 Thus, civil laws are subject to a less demanding
vagueness test than laws with criminal consequences.144 Regulatory or disciplinary rules governing a discrete professional
group receive a lesser degree of scrutiny not only because of
their noncriminal nature, but also because learned professionals can supply needed specificity through “the common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular vocation
or profession to which the standard applies.”145 Justice Bren-

137. MILORD, supra note 66, at 13.
138. In re Hey, 452 S.E.2d 24, 33 (W. Va. 1994).
139. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 23, at 93–98; see also infra Part II.A.
140. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
141. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 437 (Tex.
1998).
142. Id.
143. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
144. Id. at 499–500; Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2008)
(“Laws with civil consequences receive less exacting vagueness scrutiny.”).
145. See Perez v. Hoblock, 368 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]here the
language of a statute fails to provide an objective standard by which conduct
can be judged, the required specificity may nonetheless be provided by the
common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular vocation
or profession to which the standard applies.” (quoting Cranston v. City of
Richmond, 710 P.2d 845, 851 (Cal. 1985))).
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nan explained how professional norms may cure an otherwise
vague attorney disciplinary rule:
Given the traditions of the legal profession and an attorney’s specialized professional training, there is unquestionably some room for enforcement of standards that might be impermissibly vague in other
contexts; an attorney in many instances may properly be punished for
“conduct which all responsible attorneys would recognize as improper
for a member of the profession.”146

Put another way, when a regulation is designed to govern
an attorney’s conduct rather than the behavior of the general
public, “the central consideration in resolving a vagueness challenge should be whether the nature of the proscribed conduct
encompassed by the rule is readily understandable to a licensed
lawyer.”147 In making that determination, it is contemplated
that the lawyer will be guided by narrowing factors such as
case and statutory law, court rules, rules of conduct, and norms
informally accepted by the members of the legal profession.148
Rules of judicial conduct are evaluated by the same vagueness
test, namely, whether the ordinary judge aware of applicable
cases, statutes, rules, judicial codes, and customary norms, traditions, and practices of the judicial profession could understand and comply with the disciplinary rule.149
The question becomes, can the appearance of impropriety
prohibition be saved from vagueness attacks by application of
the “professional norms” doctrine which permits less specificity
in disciplinary rules governing professionals? The answer is no
for two reasons. First, the doctrine only speaks in terms of conduct that actually violates an accepted norm. It does not encompass conduct that only appears to violate a norm. Second,
under the doctrine, unless a rule, court decision, or statute proscribes a particular act, it is the professionals themselves who
146. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 666 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting In re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544, 555 (1968)).
147. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510, 516 (Colo. 1986).
148. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985); see also United States v.
Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999); Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 437 (Tex. 1998).
149. In re Halverson, 169 P.3d 1161, 1176 (Nev. 2007) (“Thus, when evaluating a [disciplinary] statute that applies only to judges, the issue is whether
an ordinary judge could understand and comply with it.”); Gray, supra note
23, at 93–94 (“Application of a vagueness analysis depends upon context, and
judges, like lawyers, are professionals who have the benefit of guidance provided by case law, court rules, the lore of the profession, the traditions of the
judicial profession, and its established practices.” (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)).
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establish the norms and determine what conduct violates those
norms. As Justice Brennan observed, attorneys or other professionals may be held responsible for conduct which all responsible members of the profession would recognize as improper.150
But what constitutes an improper appearance under a judicial
code is not determined by judges but by the hypothetical reasonable person. For these reasons, the professional norms exception is unavailable to save the impermissibly vague appearance standard.
1. Professional Norms Require Actual Misconduct
Applying professional norms to save a vague disciplinary
rule is arguably justifiable when evaluating conduct that constitutes an actual impropriety. For example, a college professor’s vagueness challenge to a rule requiring faculty members
to “maintain standards of sound scholarship and competent
teaching” is properly rejected because a reasonable professor
knows what academia expects.151 Under this same rationale,
courts have rejected due process challenges to vague rules
sanctioning lawyers for “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”152 It is correctly presumed that lawyers
in the daily course of their practice learn what type of conduct
is deemed unacceptable within the legal profession. Equally
broad judicial disciplinary standards, proscribing “misconduct
in office”153 and “conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice,” survive vagueness attacks154 because judges, like lawyers, know they are expected to act in accordance with established professional practices.
But each of these imprecise disciplinary rules punishes actual impropriety. They require that the offender actually com150. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
151. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3d Cir. 1992).
152. See, e.g., Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 843 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir.
1988); In re Comfort, 159 P.3d 1011, 1024 (Kan. 2007); In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Against N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1985). Some courts
have approved the “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” attorney disciplinary standard only after giving the phrase a limiting construction.
See, e.g., In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 379 (Mass. 2008) (restricting the
phrase, “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,” to “egregious” acts which “undermine the legitimacy of the judicial process.” (citing In
re Discipline of Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d 1093, 1098–99 (Mass. 1996))); Two
Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d at 1099; In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 491–92 (N.J. 1982);
In re Gadbois, 786 A.2d 393, 400 (Vt. 2001).
153. Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 614 –15 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
154. In re Disbarment of Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 806 (Minn. 1978).
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mit an improper act which violates a norm established and accepted by members of the regulated profession. These standards do not prohibit acts which merely appear to be improper,
but in fact violate no professional norm. Thus, a professor may
suffer adverse consequences for failing to engage in “sound
scholarship,” but does not violate any rule by only appearing to
fail to produce a scholarly piece. Similarly, an attorney is subject to discipline for conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice, but not for conduct which only appears to be prejudicial.155 The fact that impropriety-based disciplinary rules may
withstand constitutional attack does not lend support to the
argument that rules imposing sanctions for appearances, in the
absence of actual wrongdoing, also comply with due process.
2. Professionals Establish Professional Norms
More fundamentally, vague conduct rules survive constitutional challenge only because of the special knowledge members of a profession gain from dealing with their fellow professionals. Thus, a lawyer is legitimately presumed to recognize
conduct considered improper by lawyers, even in the absence of
a rule, statute, or case outlawing the particular deed in question. Similarly, judges know what behavior other judges uniformly deem improper. If a judge’s responsibility was limited
to avoiding actual improprieties as set forth in rules, statutes,
and court decisions, or established less formally by mutual consent of members of the profession, then a disciplinary standard
prohibiting “impropriety,” although vague, arguably could be
sustained under a professional norms theory. But under the
appearance standard, perceived improprieties are not determined by the collective judgment of members of the judicial
profession. Instead, appearances are judged by the ordinary
reasonable person. Insertion of the ordinary observer into the
equation defeats any argument that professional norms supply
needed specificity to the appearance standard. Once the rea155. Canon 9 of the ABA’s 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility
provided that “[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1969). No similar
provision appeared in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct enacted in 1983
because the “appearance of impropriety” standard was considered too vague to
govern attorney conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 5
(1983); Lee E. Hejmanowski, An Ethical Treatment of Attorneys’ Personal Conflicts of Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 881, 897 (1993) (commenting that the appearance of impropriety standard of Canon 9 was removed “on the grounds
that, standing alone, it was inherently vague and insufficient to justify [attorney] disqualification orders”).
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sonable observer enters the picture, the question is no longer
what the judicial profession deems improper but what individuals outside the profession perceive as appearing improper. For
due process purposes, a judge can be held to professionally generated and accepted norms but not to public perceptions. And it
is no answer to suggest that disciplining judges based on lay
impressions is acceptable because the reasonable person’s
judgment is relied upon in virtually every field of law. As demonstrated in Part II.B, the reasonable person is designed to determine facts not appearances, and is ill-fitted to assist in the
task of narrowing ambiguous statutes.
B. THE REASONABLE PERSON, VAGUENESS, AND THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
Rule 1.2 of the 2007 Code provides that a judge may be disciplined for any conduct which creates an appearance of impropriety.156 Comment 5 to the Rule defines “appearance of impropriety” to include any conduct which (1) causes a perception
that the judge violated a specific code provision or (2) “reflects
adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or
fitness to serve as a judge.”157 In determining whether a judge’s
conduct creates an unacceptable appearance, the judge’s subjective view of his or her behavior is irrelevant.158 A disinterested, objective arbiter is needed for such an important task
and, as usual, that means that the reasonable person is called
into service.
Without question, the go-to-guy in the law is the reasonable person. This standard bearer routinely decides matters
such as the meaning of the U.S. Constitution,159 whether an

156. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007).
157. Id. cmt. 5.
158. See Miller v. Blackden, 913 A.2d 742, 749 (N.H. 2006) (“Whether an
appearance of impropriety exists is determined under an objective standard,
i.e., would a reasonable person, not the judge himself, question the impartiality of the court.” (quoting Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390
(N.H. 1992))); ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 32 (2004)
(“Because the standard for determining the appearance of impropriety is objective, a judge’s own perception of motivation for behavior is irrelevant to the
analysis.”).
159. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise,
23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006) (“We focus here on one particularly significant, and significantly underappreciated, legal function of the reasonable person: The reasonable American person of 1788 determines, for 1788 and today,
the meaning of the federal Constitution.”).
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automobile driver exercised ordinary care,160 the intention of
contracting parties,161 whether a suspect is in custody for
Fourth Amendment162 or Fifth Amendment purposes,163 the
applicability of sentencing enhancement factors,164 and a myriad of other factual and legal issues.165 The reasonable person
is assigned these various responsibilities because “[t]he standard of conduct which the community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment,
good or bad, of the particular actor, and it must be, so far as
possible, the same for all persons, since the law can have no favorites.”166

160. See Martinovic v. Ferry, 34 Cal. Rptr. 692, 697 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(finding that a truck driver was required to use the degree of care that the ordinary, reasonable person would use under the same or similar circumstances); Pontello v. Quartz & Dugas, Inc., 534 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976) (finding little evidence “that the driver failed to take such precautions
. . . as should have been taken by an ordinarily reasonable person in the exercise of ordinary care”).
161. Towson Univ. v. Conte, 862 A.2d 941, 947 (Md. 2004) (“[T]he true test
of what is meant [by a contract term] is not what the parties to the contract
intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant.” (quoting Calomiris v. Woods, 727 A.2d 358,
363 (Md. 1999))); Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV.
293, 301 (1997) (“Professor Slawson states that ‘[t]he objective theory of contracts . . . dictates that a contract shall have the meaning that a reasonable
person would give it under the circumstances under which it was made . . . .’”
(first omission in original)).
162. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (2007).
163. Yarbough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Stitman, 472 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2007)
(finding sentencing enhancement for possessing a weapon in connection with a
robbery applicable where a reasonable person, under the circumstances of the
robbery, would regard the object displayed as a dangerous weapon).
165. E.g., Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008)
(stating that whether a message on a specialty license plate is considered government or private speech is determined by the ordinary reasonable person);
McCoy v. Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007) (employing the reasonable person standard to determine if an employee suffered a constructive
discharge); Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (using the
reasonable person standard to determine whether the resignation of an armed
services member is a product of duress); Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of
Wis., 588 N.W.2d 26, 33 (Wis. 1999) (defining informed consent in terms of
what a reasonable person in the position of the patient would want to know).
166. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 32, at 173–74 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
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1. The Reasonable Person’s Appearance in Judicial Ethics
With the reasonable person firmly entrenched in most
areas of the law, it was natural that the judicial ethics community would select the hypothetical observer as the standard by
which to assess the propriety of a judge’s conduct. Professor
Thode initiated the movement by interpreting Canon 3C(1) of
the 1972 Code to require judicial disqualification whenever a
judge’s conduct “would lead a reasonable man knowing all the
circumstances to the conclusion that the judge’s ‘impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.’”167 Following Thode’s lead,
the 1990 Code adopted the reasonable person test for judging
not only the appearance of partiality, but also the appearance
of any type of impropriety.168 The 2007 Code followed suit.169
Indeed, the overwhelming majority of states evaluate the propriety of a judge’s personal and professional conduct through
the eyes of the reasonable person.170
The reasonable person, however, was conceived and designed to determine facts, not appearances. Consequently, the
characteristics built into this fictional creature which help to
facilitate a factual determination in a contract or tort case, for
example, do not assist, and in many ways are inconsistent with,
the task of evaluating appearances and perceptions. Of special
167. THODE, supra note 90, at 60–61.
168. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt. (1990) (“The
test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.”).
169. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2007) (“The test for
appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable
minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament,
or fitness to serve as a judge.”). Rule 2.11 of the 2007 Code requires a judge to
“disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id. R. 2.11(A).
170. See Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 949, 956 (1996) (“The leading view is that a court should review
judicial behavior by its appearance ‘to a reasonable person following review of
the totality of circumstances.’”); see also In re Chaisson, 549 So. 2d 259, 263
(La. 1989) (“The proper test of whether Judge Chaisson’s actions gave the appearance of impropriety is an objective one: whether a reasonable person
would be justified in suspecting that Judge Chaisson lent ‘the prestige of his
office to advance the private interest’ of [another].” (quoting In re Foster, 318
A.2d 523, 533 (Md. 1974))); Mosley v. Nev. Comm’n on Judicial Discipline, 102
P.3d 555, 560 (Nev. 2004) (employing the “objective reasonable person standard” in disciplining a judge); In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 714 (Or. 1998)
(finding that an objective reasonable observer would conclude that the judge
used court stationery for a private purpose); infra Part II.B.2.
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concern in the context of a vagueness analysis is the reasonable
person’s attribute of possessing all relevant facts and circumstances.
2. The Fully Informed Reasonable Person and the Appearance
of Impropriety: A Paradox
When determining civil or criminal law issues, the reasonable person is presumed to know and understand all material
facts.171 For example, when judging whether an automobile
driver exercised ordinary care, the reasonable person (acting
through the trier of fact)172 is presented with all the circumstances surrounding the accident.173 Similarly, when called
upon to determine whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda
purposes, the objective observer reviews every aspect of the interrogation.174
The reasonable person employed by the judicial ethics
community also possesses all the facts.175 This ubiquitous observer of judicial conduct is variously described as “fully informed,”176 “knowing all the circumstances,”177 “know[ing] and
171. See Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 166 (Mich. 1993) (“[T]he reasonable person standard examines the totality of circumstances to ensure a
fair result.”); see also cases cited infra notes 173–74.
172. DiMatteo, supra note 161, at 312 (“The reasonable person is applied
through the mind of the judicial interpreter.”).
173. See Barron v. Honeywell, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 390, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(“[S]ummary judgment is usually not appropriate in negligence cases . . . because the application of the reasonable person standard normally requires full
exposition of all the underlying facts and circumstances.”); Cucinella v. Weston Biscuit Co., 265 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1954) (permitting evidence of custom
for the purpose of giving the jury “full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances which existed at the time and place of the accident, which were known
to the parties, so as to permit the jury to pass upon the question of whether
plaintiff conducted himself as an ordinary and reasonable person would have
conducted himself in the light of all the circumstances” (quoting Muir v. Cheney Bros., Inc., 148 P.2d 138, 141 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944))).
174. Morales v. United States, 866 A.2d 67, 71–72 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
that in determining whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes “the
court is obliged to consider ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ in reaching its conclusion” (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,
322 (1994))).
175. See infra notes 176–80 and accompanying text.
176. Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Servs., Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 715
(7th Cir. 1986) (quoting Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir.
1985)); Drake v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345 (N.D.
Ala. 2007); Miller v. Blackden, 913 A.2d 742, 749 (N.H. 2006).
177. Richardson v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2008) (knowing all the circumstances); United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir.
2007) (knowing all the facts); McGuire v. McGuire, 924 A.2d 886, 891 (Conn.
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understand[ing] all the relevant facts,”178 and aware of the “totality of circumstances.”179
But the person who is fully informed of all facts and circumstances surrounding a suspect act of a judge knows whether or not an actual impropriety occurred, so mere appearances
of impropriety cannot logically be gauged from the perspective
of a fully informed reasonable person. Applying such a standard is therefore paradoxical. As pointed out by Professor Rotunda, if the informed observer concludes that the judge actually committed a rule violation, an impropriety should be
charged. On the other hand, if the observer’s review of pertinent facts leads to the conclusion that no actual impropriety occurred, there is no appearance of impropriety.180 An example
will illustrate the paradox.
Assume that a judge proceeds to the courthouse cafeteria
for lunch. After purchasing a sandwich, the judge takes the only vacant seat, which happens to be at the table occupied by an
attorney currently on trial before the judge. The judge advises
the attorney that the case will not be discussed. The lawyer
agrees and no further discussion of any kind takes place.181
How does the reasonable lunchroom guest view this situation? Unfortunately, it depends on how much information the
observer possesses. Most cafeteria patrons might recognize the
judge, and possibly the lawyer, but probably would not know
the two were on trial together. An observer who was fully informed would conclude that no ex parte communication or other impropriety occurred. In fact, the knowledgeable observer
might applaud the judge’s ethical sensitivity. Appearances
App. Ct. 2007) (knowing all the circumstances); State v. Ross, 974 P.2d 11, 20
(Haw. 1998) (knowing all the facts); Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 196 P.3d
1162, 1179 (Kan. 2008) (knowing all the circumstances); Miss. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance v. Boland, 975 So. 2d 882, 895 (Miss. 2008) (knowing all
the circumstances).
178. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir.
1988); State v. Perala, 130 P.3d 852, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (requiring the
reasonable person to know and understand all the relevant facts).
179. In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 583 (Pa. 1992); Abramson, supra note 170,
at 956 (“The leading view is that a court should review judicial behavior by its
appearance ‘to a reasonable person following review of the totality of circumstances.’”).
180. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, The Appearance of Impropriety,
and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1360
(2006) (“[I]f it is not an impropriety, how can it look like an impropriety . . . ?”).
181. This illustration is based on Wells v. Del Norte School District C-7, 753
P.2d 770, 772 (Colo. App. 1987).
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simply are of no concern to the observer who is aware of reality.
It is only the partially informed onlooker who encounters an
appearance problem. So, a person aware of the trial, but unaware of the availability of a single lunch seat and unaware of
the judge’s admonishment, might believe that an impropriety
was afoot. But the selectively informed observer is not the
standard by which the judge’s conduct is evaluated. Courts and
judicial codes dictate that a judge’s behavior is evaluated by a
person who by definition knows and understands all facts surrounding an occurrence. The law does not and should not recognize the partially informed reasonable person.
3. The Birth of the Partially Informed Reasonable Person
Instead of admitting that the reasonable person standard
cannot be employed in judging appearances because appearances generally depend on less-than-complete information,
some courts have surgically removed the requirement that the
observer of judicial conduct be fully informed. While giving lipservice to the traditionally accepted definition of the fully informed reasonable person, these courts find an appearance of
judicial impropriety on the probable opinion of the partially informed observer.182 As redefined, the reasonable person “is not
necessarily one who is informed of every conceivably relevant
fact,”183 and may be no more than a “casual reasonable observer.”184 A few jurisdictions specifically reduce the quantum of
knowledge from all the facts to “the facts that a reasonable inquiry would disclose,”185 or the “facts in the public domain.”186

182. The attempt by some courts to rely on a less than fully informed observer is surprising because the drafters of the 1990 Code rejected a proposal
which would have directed judges to evaluate their behavior from the perspective of the person who only knows what is “apparent.” Abramson, supra note
170, at 956–57 n.24 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 7 (1990) (Discussion Draft of 1989)).
183. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1340 (Alaska 1991).
184. In re Haley, 720 N.W.2d 246, 270 (Mich. 2006) (Kelly, J., dissenting).
185. E.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2A (2009),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/codeOfConduct/Code_Effective_
July-01-09.pdf (“An appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds,
with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that the judge’s honesty, integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is impaired.”); DEL. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (2010) (“The test for the appearance of impropriety is
whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of all
the relevant circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity,

2010]

THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

1947

For some judges and commentators, the partly informed observer may determine appearances from available information,
including incomplete or unproven media reports.187 This view is
illustrated by Justice Allen’s concurring opinion in Childers v.
Florida.188 Justice Allen, relying on information contained in
newspaper articles, criticized a fellow judge for failing to disqualify himself from an appeal.189 While admitting that he could
not vouch for the accuracy of the articles, Justice Allen concluded that since public perceptions were at stake, “[w]hether
completely accurate or not, the significant point here is that
these articles reflect what the public has been told.”190 Legal
commentator Howard Bashman, adopting Justice Allen’s reasoning, agrees that the observer evaluating the propriety of the
judge’s conduct should only be charged with the knowledge
“available to the ordinary person.”191 But that is clearly not the
case.
impartiality, and competence is impaired.”); FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 2A cmt. (2009) (same).
186. See, e.g., Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex. App. 2000)
(“[T]he inquiry should be ‘whether a reasonable member of the public at large,
knowing all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge’s conduct,
would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial.’”).
187. As observed by Justice Fuchsberg, “‘appearances’ more often are the
product of the publicity rather than that of the underlying conduct.” In re Nicholson v. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 409 N.E.2d 818, 827 (N.Y. 1980)
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in part).
188. 936 So. 2d 619, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
189. See id. at 623–29.
190. Id. at 623. The Florida Supreme Court publically reprimanded Justice
Allen for using a concurring opinion to personally attack a fellow judge and for
accusing the fellow judge of official corruption based on unverified “facts” in
newspaper stories. In re Allen, 998 So. 2d 557, 563 (Fla. 2008). The Supreme
Court’s opinion, however, did not undermine the use of press reports in assessing appearances. In fact, the court buttressed its conclusion that Justice Allen’s concurring opinion damaged faith in the judiciary with the fact that,
“[t]he proliferation of newspaper articles and public commentary statewide
after the publication of the Childers [concurring] opinion was a clear indication that the opinion did not promote public confidence in the judiciary but instead had the opposite effect.” Id. at 563. But see Lucy Morgan, State High
Court to Discipline Judge, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at 7B (observing that while critical of Justice Allen’s use of news reports, the court relied on newspapers to support its reprimand of Justice Allen).
191. Howard J. Bashman, When Should a Judge Face Discipline for What
an Opinion Says?, LAW.COM, May 14, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/Law
ArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005555174 (defending Justice Allen’s use of press
reports because the relevant disqualification inquiry is whether a person with
knowledge of the facts would conclude that a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned and such determination is necessarily based on information available to an average person).
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Like all legal issues, judges determine appearance of impropriety—
not by considering what a straw poll of the only partly informed manin-the-street would show—but by examining the record facts and the
law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person knowing and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge.192

Information gleaned from newspaper reports was also controlling in In re Blackman.193 In Blackman, the court held that
a judge must avoid any conduct that might be open to criticism
by the press whether or not the media’s interpretation of the
judge’s behavior is accurate or reasonable.194 Taking appearances one step further, another court concluded that information sufficient to necessitate an investigation may itself create
an appearance of impropriety, even if the subsequent investigation dispels any suspicion of misconduct.195
The fact that the fully informed observer does not fit nicely
into the appearance of impropriety test is no reason to reduce
the quantum of information traditionally attached to the reasonable person.196 Such a concession is especially dangerous
192. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir.
1988); see also United States v. Tucker, 82 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir. 1996) (McMillian, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to question a judge’s impartiality on the basis of information retrieved from newspapers and magazines); In re Hamilton, 932 A.2d 1030, 1035 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 2007)
(“[T]his court does not make its decisions on whether particular conduct
. . . brings the judicial office into disrepute based upon the level of media coverage the conduct may attract.”).
193. 591 A.2d 1339, 1341 (N.J. 1991).
194. See id. at 1342. Judge Blackman was reprimanded for attending an
annual Labor Day picnic hosted by a felon. Id. at 1340–41. In reaching its decision, the court did not rely upon the ordinary reasonable person’s view of the
propriety or impropriety of the judge’s conduct. Instead, the court found the
controlling test to be “whether there is a fair possibility that some portion of
the public might become concerned on that score.” Id. at 1342. This test is certainly troubling when one considers that some portion of the American public,
nearly sixteen million people, believe that Elvis Presley is alive. Dana Blanton, Poll: For a Few True Believers, Elvis Lives, FOXNEWS.COM, Aug. 14, 2002,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,60353,00.html.
195. In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1237 n.38 (Alaska 2000) (“Because conduct that necessitates a full-scale inquiry to allay public suspicion itself suggests impropriety, an impermissible appearance also might be foundregardless of whether an investigation eventually dispelled suspicion of actual
misconduct.”).
196. See In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 582 (Pa. 1992) (“While we agree with
the suggested application of the reasonable person standard, [in judicial discipline cases] we reject as entirely untenable the suggestion that it be a reasonable uniformed or misinformed person standard.”); Roberta K. Flowers,
What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 727 (1998) (“Because misinformed or
uninformed persons may assign guilt where none exists, courts have required
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where the improper appearance is created by media criticism or
publicity generated by partisans.197 Disciplinary decisions, just
like any other adjudicatory result, must be based on the law
and all relevant facts, not mirages.198
4. Summing Up: The Reasonable Person and Professional
Norms
The reasonable person is a proven master in evaluating actual conduct and misconduct. However, he or she is no help
when it comes to judging appearances or saving vague disciplinary rules. In fact, appointing this hypothetical observer as the
arbiter of improper judicial appearances defeats any attempt to
use professional norms to cure the facial imprecision of the appearance of impropriety standard. First, as previously demonstrated, professional norms, other than those set by rule, statute, or case law, are established by the members of the
regulated profession, not by those outside the profession.
Second, assuming that the reasonable person’s views are relevant in establishing norms, the objective observer is, by definition, imbued with all relevant facts and therefore knows
whether an impropriety has taken place. If it has, a disciplinary proceeding should be instituted based on actual wrongdoing. But if the reasonable person determines that no misconduct occurred, then inescapably there is no appearance of
wrongdoing, at least to the individual aware of all the circumstances.199 And finally, even if the reasonable person is reconstructed to possess only information “reasonably available,” or
the appearance of impropriety to be judged based on the totality of the circumstances.”).
197. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 923 (2004) (Scalia, J., in
chambers) (order denying motion to recuse) (disagreeing with the proposition
that a judge must disqualify where “a significant portion of the press, which is
deemed to be the American public, demands it”); In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194,
202 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The appearance of partiality . . . must have an objective
basis beyond the fact that claims of partiality have been well publicized. . . . The test . . . is one of reasonableness, and the appearance of partiality portrayed in the media may be, at times, unreasonable.”); United States v.
Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that most courts do not
find media criticism sufficient grounds for recusal); Larsen, 616 A.2d at 583
(“Indeed if appearances were gauged without reference to the full and true
facts, then false appearances of impropriety could be manufactured with ease
by anyone with personal or political animus toward a judge.”).
198. Cf. United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 961 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (“[T]o say that [the recusal statute] requires concern for appearances is
not to say that it requires concern for mirages.”).
199. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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within the “public domain,” or accessible to the “casual observer,” a judge cannot be charged with violating a professional
norm set by a partially informed observer. There is simply no
way for a judge to identify the norm because a judge can only
guess what part of the full picture the observer possesses. The
reliance of the appearance of impropriety standard on either
the fully or partially informed reasonable person defeats any
argument that professional norms save the vague disciplinary
standard.
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DISCIPLINING
APPEARANCES
Although a cost-benefit analysis has been described as “essential to the regulation of professional conduct,”200 the concept
is rarely discussed or applied in evaluating rules governing
judicial behavior.201 It may be that the lack of attention to the
otherwise well-traveled analytical method is due to the abstract
rather than measureable interests involved in judicial ethics.
Or it may be that no cost is too great to further, or at least appear to further, public confidence in the judiciary. In any event,
the benefits of the appearance of impropriety standard are generally exaggerated and overemphasized while the costs are ignored, undervalued, and rationalized.202
This Part does not purport to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of employing
200. David Ira Rosenbaum, Comment, Punitive Damages in Professional
Malpractice Cases, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1431, 1439 (1988).
201. But see WIS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT SCR 60.03(1) cmt. (2007),
available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rules/chap60.pdf (providing a list of
factors disciplinary bodies should consider in “achiev[ing] a balance between
the need to maintain the integrity and dignity of the judiciary and the right of
judges to conduct their personal lives in accordance with the dictates of their
individual consciences”).
202. See Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 11 So. 2d 107,
114 (Miss. 2009) (“A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge’s
conduct that might be reviewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly.” (quoting MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 2A cmt. (2009))); M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot the Canons:
Maintaining the Appearance of Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
45, 54 (2005) (“[A]spiring to avoid the appearance of impropriety imposes no
significant burden on the judiciary.”); Letter from Nancy L. Cohen, President,
Nat’l Org. of Bar Counsel, to the Joint Comm’n to Evaluate the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicial
ethics/resources/comm_rules-NOBC_120506_bw.pdf (“The ‘Appearance of Impropriety’ standard has been a part of judicial ethics for a long time and its
application has not caused any undue concern over that time period.”).
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the appearance of impropriety as a disciplinary standard. It attempts, however, to expose some of the hidden costs of punishing appearances and to place in perspective the often highly
touted benefits of the rule.
A. COSTS
Two disadvantages are inherent in the prohibition against
improper appearances. First, the vague rule has a “chilling effect” on the First Amendment activities of judges and their
family members. Second, on occasion, the standard is misapplied resulting in unwarranted damage to a judge’s reputation,
or worse, the imposition of a disciplinary sanction.
1. The Chilling Effect of Appearance-Based Discipline
Vague laws suffer from a lack of predictability. Individuals
subject to an imprecise regulation often play it safe and forego
lawful activity, even constitutionally protected activity, rather
than risk a wrong guess as to whether a contemplated act is
forbidden.203 This “chilling effect” is especially offensive when
First Amendment freedoms are at stake.204 Although the extent
to which a vague rule actually results in an actor’s abstention
from protected activity is often a matter of speculation, it is undeniable that the uncertainty surrounding application of the
appearance standard has resulted in judges declining to exercise constitutionally guaranteed rights.205 Sadly, it is not only
judges who suffer from the ambiguous nature of the appearance
standard. Family members of judges are also called upon to sacrifice important rights in the name of upholding the appearance
of judicial propriety.206

203. See In re Hey, 452 S.E.2d 24, 33 (W. Va. 1994) (“[V]ague regulations
fail to adequately direct regulatees and cause them to play it safe by foregoing
participation in public discussion, thus discouraging them from engaging in
what would be protected expression and also depriving the public of their contributions.”).
204. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963).
205. See Deanell Reece Tacha, Liberty, Justice, Freedom: Without Lawyers
They’re Only Words, JUDGES’ J., Winter 1996, at 26, 46 (“I fear that in the
name of ethics―that is, the avoidance of conflicts of interests and appearances
of impropriety―we have withdrawn to a greater extent than necessary from
the lives of our communities and from the civic life of the nation.”); infra Part
III.A.1.a.
206. See infra Part III.A.1.b.
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a. Judges and the Big Chill
One example illustrating how the fundamental rights of
judges may be infringed by the appearance clause is found in
an advisory opinion issued by the Virginia Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee. The opinion advised judges that voting in a
primary election created an appearance of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of the Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.207 The
Virginia Advisory Committee opined that “‘reasonable’ people
could easily perceive that a judge who votes in a party primary
is unable to act with impartiality.”208 The Committee further
explained that the public perceives primary voters as partisan
and therefore judges who vote in a primary put at risk the apolitical nature of the judiciary and erode public confidence in the
courts.209
Two Virginia judges fearful of violating a state advisory
opinion, but valuing their right to participate in the electoral
process, filed a lawsuit challenging the advisory opinion’s bar
against primary voting.210 The federal district court dismissed
the case as “non-justiciable.”211 Not until four years later did
the Virginia Supreme Court disavow the advisory opinion by
amending the state’s judicial code to declare that “[t]he act of a
judge voting in a primary election is the discharge of an honorable civic duty, an obligation of responsible citizenship, and
does not give the ‘appearance of impropriety.’”212 Presumably,
the majority of Virginia judges, like the two plaintiffs who attempted to enjoin the operation of the advisory opinion, forewent their “obligation of responsible citizenship”213 and did not

207. Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99-6 (1999), http://www
.courts.state.va.us/agencies/jirc/opinions/1999/99-6.html. Many states have issued opinions permitting judges to vote in primaries. See, e.g., Colo. Judicial
Ethics Advisory Bd., Op. 2008-2 (2008), http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/
File/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Committees/Judicial_Ethics_Advisory_
Board/opinion2008-02_1.pdf (permitting judges to vote in primary elections);
Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 02-1 (2002), http://www
.utcourts.gov/resources/ethadv/ethics_opinions/2002/02-1.htm (permitting judges
to vote in primaries but observing that “whether a judge may participate in the
primary election” is a difficult question).
208. Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99-6 (1999), http://www
.courts.state.va.us/agencies/jirc/opinions/1999/99-6.html.
209. See id.
210. Kemler v. Poston, 108 F. Supp. 2d 529, 530 (E.D. Va. 2000).
211. Id. at 543.
212. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt. (2004).
213. Id.
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participate in the primary process until the state supreme
court spoke in 2004.214
Further restricting voting rights, several ethics advisory
committees caution judges against attending political nominating caucuses because it may appear that the judge is participating in a prohibited political meeting or endorsing a political
candidate.215 Other jurisdictions, in the name of protecting appearances, forbid judges from signing a petition to place a candidate’s name on the ballot.216
214. Kemler, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 533 (noting that the plaintiff-judges had
refrained from voting in primaries pending adjudication of the lawsuit).
Judges, as a general rule, obey their state’s judicial ethics advisory opinions
partly because judges are a cautious breed, but also because of the potential
adverse consequences arising from ignoring such opinions. See, e.g., In re Ambrecht (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 29, 2008) http://www.scjc
.state.ny.us/Determinations/A/Ambrecht.htm (disciplining a judge for violating
“guidelines provided in numerous opinions of the Advisory Committee on
Judicial Ethics”); In re Bonner, at 2 (Wash. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Aug.
3, 2007), http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/Case%20Material/2007/5324%20Stip%20w
%20attach.pdf (citing advisory opinions in support of its conclusion that a
judge violated judicial conduct rules by voluntarily writing a character reference on behalf of a criminal defendant); see also State v. Smith, 50 P.3d 825,
830 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc) (citing Arizona Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee
opinions in a judicial discipline case); In re Luzzo, 756 So. 2d 76, 78–79 (Fla.
2000) (citing Florida advisory opinions in a judicial discipline proceeding);
Summe v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 46–47 (Ky. 1997)
(same); In re Runyan, 707 N.E.2d 580, 585–86 (Ohio Comm’n of Judges 1999)
(citing ethics advisory opinions in a disciplinary decision).
215. See, e.g., Colo. Judicial Ethics Advisory Bd., Op. 2008-2 (2008),
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/
Committees/Judicial_Ethics_Advisory_Board/opinion2008-02_1.pdf; Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-24 (1988), http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/
ClerkCt/JE24.pdf; Neb. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 08-1 (2008), http://
supremecourt.ne.gov/professional-ethics/judges/ethics-committee/pdf/08-1.pdf;
Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Informal Op. 88-7 (1988), http://www
.utcourts.gov/resources/ethadv/ethics_opinions/1988/88-7.htm; Wash. Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 08-1 (2008), http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/
pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos_ethics.dispopin&mode=0801; see also Political
Party Caucuses and Primaries/Inaugural Events, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Spring
2008, at 3, 3.
216. See, e.g., Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
92-32 (1992), http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/
jeacopinions/ninet2/92-32.html (finding that signing a nominating petition violates Canons 2 and 7A(1)(b) of the Florida Code because the act could be perceived as an endorsement of a candidate); Pa. Conference of State Trial Judges
Judicial Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2000-1 (2000), http://www.pabulletin.com/
secure/data/vol30/30-18/692.html (“A bare majority of the Committee is of the
opinion that signing a nomination petition is prohibited . . . .”); Mass. Judicial
Ethics Comm., Op. 99-13 (1999), http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/99-13h.html
(finding that signing a candidate’s petition violates Canon 2(A) of the Massachusetts Code). Other states take a more enlightened view. E.g., Ill. Judicial
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The conclusion that the public perceives primary voting as
improper political involvement rather than a praiseworthy act
of citizenship simply has no empirical, anecdotal, or commonsense support.217 Equally unfounded is the suggestion that public confidence in the judiciary is weakened by attendance at
nominating caucuses or by signing nomination petitions.218
Nevertheless, based upon phantom appearances judges have
been deprived of cherished rights necessary to the success of a
democratic form of government. Nor can it be seriously claimed
that mandated abstention from the political nomination process
is merely another example of the price judges must willingly
pay for the right to hold a position of public trust. As recognized
in Wesberry v. Sanders:219
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if
the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for
classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this
right.220

Regrettably, interference with First Amendment rights is
not restricted to a judge’s political activity. Under the guise of
protecting appearances, advisory committees have cautioned
judges against serving their religious congregations as a weekend pastor,221 acting as a minister or pastor at any “regular”
Ethics Comm., Op. 03-06 (2003), http://www.ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/03-06.htm
(advising that judges may sign nominating petitions).
217. See Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Informal Op. 02-1 (2002),
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/ethadv/ethics_opinions/2002/02-1.htm (“A
judge appearing at a polling place will be seen by few people and the perception of the appearance is most likely to be recognition of the fact that the judge
is participating in an election process, and not a perception that the judge is
tied to any political ideology. The public recognizes the rights of judges as citizens and understands that a judge’s participation in that process does not
have significant meaning related to the integrity and partiality of the judiciary.”); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 6 (2007)
(“Judges and judicial candidates retain the right to participate in the political
process as voters in both primary and general elections.”).
218. See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 89-89 (1989), http://
www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/89-89.htm (“The signing of a nominating petition is a minuscule act in the overall election process, akin to the
voting process rather than to the campaigning process.”); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 6 (2007) (stating that participation in a caucustype election does not constitute prohibited political activity).
219. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
220. Id. at 17–18.
221. See Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-25 (1988), http://www
.kscourts.org/pdf/ClerkCt/JE25.pdf (finding that a judge may not serve as a
weekend pastor because “the appearance to a litigant or lawyer member of a
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church service,222 holding the position of church treasurer,223 or
passing a collection basket at a worship service.224
b. Leaving Family Members in the Cold
It is bad enough when the inability to gauge the breadth of
a judicial code provision causes persons subject to the code to
forego the exercise of fundamental rights. It is far worse when
a vague restriction chills the activities of individuals not even
governed by the code.
Codes of judicial conduct regulate the behavior of judges,
not the activities of a judge’s family members.225 For example,
no rule of judicial conduct could legitimately claim to restrict a
family member’s First Amendment right to engage in political
activity.226 Ignoring this fact, many judicial advisory commitdenomination other than that of the minister-judge could well create a feeling
of being disadvantaged”).
222. See Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 08-1 (2008), http://www
.courts.state.va.us/agencies/jirc/opinions/2008/08_1.html (“[A] judge should not
act as a pastor or minister at a regular church service . . . .”). But see S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 4 -2008 (2008), http://www
.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=04 -2008
(holding that a magistrate may serve as pastor of a church).
223. Compare Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1975-10 (1975), http://
mdcourts.gov/ethics/opinions/1970s/1975-10.pdf (recommending that judge not
serve as church treasurer), with Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1979-05
(1979), http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/opinions/1970s/1979-05.pdf (permitting judge
to serve as bar association treasurer).
224. See Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 08-1 (2008), http://www
.courts.state.va.us/agencies/jirc/opinions/2008/08_1.html.
225. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. para. 3 (2007) (“The
Model Code of Judicial Conduct establishes standards for the ethical conduct
of judges and judicial candidates.”); see also N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial
Ethics, Op. 06-142 (2006), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/
06-142.htm (“The Rules Governing Judicial Conduct do not impose obligations
upon spouses of judges.”); Ind. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, Op. 2-93
(1993), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-qual/docs/adops/2-93.pdf (“Judicial spouses are not personally bound by the Code in the sense that, unlike their spouses,
they are not subject to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction for Code violations.”);
U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Op. 53 (1977) (amended
1998), http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/53.html (“The Code of Conduct does
not govern the conduct of judge’s [sic] spouses.”).
226. See In re Gaulkin, 351 A.2d 740, 745 (N.J. 1976) (“[I]n voluminous
writings of recent years concerning judicial ethics there does not seem to be
the slightest suggestion that any prohibition of a spouse’s service in or candidacy for public office is either necessary or appropriate.”); Ariz. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 03-05 (2003), http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/
ethics_opinions/2003/03-05.pdf (“[N]othing in the code of judicial conduct in
any state prevents members of a judge’s family from running for political office, supporting others’ candidacy for political office, or being involved publicly
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tees, under the pretext of protecting appearances, purport to
limit the independent political endeavors of a judge’s spouse.
Restrictions are purportedly justified on the theory that a
spouse’s campaign activities in support of a cause or candidate
may appear to reflect the views of the judge. Illustrating this
point is judicial ethics expert Cynthia Gray’s observation that
“[s]everal advisory opinions prohibit a judge from allowing his
or her spouse to hold gatherings in support of a candidate in
the judge’s home.”227 Ms. Gray’s observation is accurate. The
Kansas Ethics Advisory Panel concluded that the wife of a
judge could not host a meet-the-governor event at a home held
in joint tenancy with the judge because the gathering “may well
be viewed by the general public as a political endorsement by
the judge himself of a candidate for public office.”228 A Texas
opinion reached the same result, surmising that the public
views a fundraiser in a home shared by a judge and spouse as
sponsored by the judge, not the spouse.229
A spouse’s attempt to place a campaign sign in the yard of
a jointly owned marital residence has likewise met resistance
from advisory committees. New York cautions that political
signs should not be posted by a judge’s spouse on property
jointly held with the judge because to do so “may create the impression that the judge concurs with [the] spouse’s endorsement of the candidate.”230 Because the appearance standard
has no bounds, the New York Advisory Committee on Judicial
Ethics unabashedly requires a judge to “strongly urge” that a
in other political activities . . . .”); Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 06-02 (2006),
http://www.ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/06-02.htm (“[C]odes of judicial conduct do
not, and cannot, regulate the independent political activities of a judge’s
spouse.”); Wis. Judicial Conduct Advisory Comm., Op. 97-2 (1997), http://www
.wicourts.gov/sc/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=904 (“[T]he
Code does not address political activities of a judge’s spouse, nor could it in
view of the First Amendment.”); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
R. 4.1 cmt. 5 (2007) (“[M]embers of the families of judges and judicial candidates are free to engage in their own political activity . . . .”).
227. Cynthia Gray, When a Family Member Supports a Political Candidate, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Spring 2008, at 9.
228. Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-33 (1990), http://www
.kscourts.org/pdf/ClerkCt/JE33.pdf (hosting a political event at a jointly owned
home violates Canons 2 and 7A(1) of the Kansas Judicial Code).
229. Tex. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 284 (2001), http://www.courts.state
.tx.us/judethics/281-290.htm; accord Del. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op.
2008-1 (2008), http://courts.state.de.us/jeac/opns/JEAC2008-1.pdf (advising
judge not to permit campaign or political activity in the marital residence).
230. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 96-112 (1996), http://
www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/96-112.htm.
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sign not be placed on property solely owned by the judge’s
spouse.231 Similarly, Massachusetts judges “should not allow”
spouses or children to place political signs on “the judge’s
lawn.”232
In a magnanimous gesture, some advisory bodies allow the
spouse or child of a judge to make political contributions, but
only from separately maintained funds.233 Again, the rationale
for this restriction is that a contribution from a joint account
appears to be made by the judge and the “administration of justice must be free of such appearance.”234
The immediate concern is not the archaic way in which
some ethics committees describe the marital residence as the
“judge’s home,” or the unstated assumption that a judge has
the right or ability to control the independent activities of a
spouse or adult child,235 or even the erroneous belief that a
231. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 99-118 (1999), http://
www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/99-118_.htm. It is unusual, to say
the least, for a governmental or quasi-governmental agency to dictate the substance of communications that must take place between a married couple.
Some judges may prefer not to have strongly worded conversations with their
spouses.
232. Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 98-4 (1998), http://www.mass
.gov/courts/sjc/cje/98-4h.html; accord Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op.
2005-8 (2005), http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/2005-8n.html (rebuking
judge’s adult daughter’s attempt to place a campaign sign in support of her
brother at the home occupied by the judge and daughter); Me. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 94 -3 (1994); S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 33-2001 (2001), http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisory
Opinions/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=33-2001; cf. In re McCormick, 639
N.W.2d 12, 15 n.2 (Iowa 2002) (acknowledging, but not deciding, the issue of
whether a judge is responsible for a spouse’s campaign sign).
233. See, e.g., Colo. Judicial Ethics Advisory Bd., Op. 2006-4 (2006),
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/
Committees/Judicial_Ethics_Advisory_Board/opinion2006-04_1.pdf; Kan. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-13 (1985), http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/ClerkCt/
JE13.pdf; Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 98-4 (1998), http://www.mass
.gov/courts/sjc/cje/98-4h.html.
234. In re Gaulkin, 351 A.2d 740, 747 (N.J. 1976).
235. Of course, outside the courtroom, a judge has no right or authority to
control another adult’s actions. See Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Op. JE50,
http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/310ED452-B8F8-4854-9016-74292F89
2007/0/JE50.pdf (finding that a judge has no ability to prohibit spouse’s political activity); cf. Horstkoetter v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1275 (10th
Cir. 1998) (“The [state] trooper clearly does not have the right to remove [political] signs placed in a yard owned by a spouse or someone else, or in which the
spouse or others have a property interest, such as a joint tenancy or tenancy in
common.”); Wrzesinski v. Danielson, 231 F. Supp. 2d 611, 622 (W.D. Mich.
2002) (finding that firing a court employee because the employee’s spouse
posted a political sign on joint property violates the First Amendment).

1958

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[94:1914

husband and wife share the same political views.236 What matters here is the dilemma judges and their families face when
confronted with an advisory opinion purporting to limit the exercise of important rights. The judge and other household
members can choose to follow the opinion and thereby sacrifice
rights of citizenship such as voting and political activity. Alternatively, the judge or family member may decide to ignore the
pronouncement and risk disciplinary proceedings against the
judge. By nature, judges are cautious individuals237 who generally value their reputation and office and are reticent to risk
losing either by violating even an obviously flawed advisory
opinion. The fear of disobeying an advisory opinion is heightened by the fact that even though not binding on disciplinary
bodies, these opinions are often considered persuasive in determining whether a judge violated a disciplinary rule.238 When
judges and family members, based on a fear of violating the
imprecise appearance standard, forego political or religious activities, they unnecessarily and unjustifiably suffer an injury to
their First Amendment rights.239
2. Judge Andrew J. Smithson
The unsuitability of the reasonable person for judging appearances invites judges and other members of disciplinary bodies to subconsciously substitute their own subjective evaluation of a judge’s conduct for the objective test outlined in
judicial codes. When this happens, judges become the victims of
236. See Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 06-02 (2006), http://www.ija.org/
ethicsop/opinions/06-02.htm (“While marriage is many things, it is not a merger of the political thoughts and beliefs of the individuals joined in marriage.
To the contrary, marriage ‘is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.’” (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965))).
237. Commentators often characterize judges as risk-averse. See, e.g., Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY
L.J. 1, 82 (1993) (“[J]udges . . . by temperament are likely to be risk-averse
. . . .”).
238. See Jonathan D. Persky, Note, “Ghosts That Slay”: A Contemporary
Look at State Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155, 1209–14 (2005) (discussing the nonbinding doctrine).
239. See Note, Speech, Spouses, and Standing: Is There Standing to Sue
When Sanctions Threatened Against One’s Spouse Chill Protected Expression?,
45 B.C. L. REV. 147, 163 (2003) (“When the spouse of a public employee forgoes
or hesitates to engage in protected speech out of fear that doing so will result
in direct, employment-related sanctions against the public employee, the
spouse has suffered an injury to rights protected by the First Amendment.”).
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the limitless nature of the appearance standard. One example
is the disciplinary investigation of New Jersey state court judge
Andrew J. Smithson.
During the course of jury selection, Judge Smithson’s wife,
without objection, was chosen as a juror in a criminal case presided over by her husband.240 At the conclusion of the trial, she
was identified as an alternate juror and did not participate in
the deliberations that resulted in the defendant’s conviction.241
After the conviction was affirmed on appeal, the defendant filed
a complaint with the New Jersey Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct claiming that Judge Smithson violated the state’s
judicial code by permitting his wife to serve as a juror.242
The New Jersey Advisory Committee found that the
judge’s decision to permit his wife to serve as alternate juror
violated the state code of judicial conduct because it “created,
minimally, an appearance of impropriety.”243 The Committee’s
reasoning took several steps. First, it determined that the judge
enjoyed a unique relationship with one juror that was not
“shared with nor duplicated by any other juror in the case.”244
Next, the Committee determined that marital relationships
“are significantly different from other relationships and engender associations of closeness and continuity.”245 Based on
these premises, the Committee concluded that it was possible,
if not probable, that Ms. Smithson would be viewed differently
by the other jurors. The difference would lie in “her background
and understanding derived from her experiences as [the
judge’s] spouse” and the possibility that her opinion might carry more weight with the jurors.246 No evidence was offered in
support of this conclusion.247 Neither did the Committee ex240. See Letter from Alan B. Handler, Chair, N.J. Supreme Court Advisory
Comm. on Judicial Conduct, to Andrew J. Smithson 1 (May 29, 2007), http://
www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/acjcajs.pdf [hereinafter Handler Letter].
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 2.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. The New Jersey Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct cited Elmore v. Arkansas, 144 S.W.3d 278 (Ark. 2004), in support of its finding. Handler Letter, supra note 240, at 3. Elmore reversed a defendant’s conviction because the trial judge, over objection, permitted his wife to serve on the jury.
Elmore, 144 S.W.3d at 279. The court reasoned that since the jury might give
the judge’s spouse’s opinion “more credence or weight” an appearance of impropriety was created. Id. at 280. The opinion does not indicate if a discipli-
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plain how this special background and understanding could influence the jury since Ms. Smithson did not participate in the
deliberations.
The New Jersey Advisory Committee committed an error
common when dealing with the amorphous appearance standard. Simply put, the Committee answered the wrong question.
The Committee members, relying on their own subjective assessment of the situation, decided that a judge’s spouse should
not serve as a juror in a case presided over by the judge.248 But
that is a policy question properly left to those charged with
writing a judicial code. A disciplinary committee’s assignment
in investigating a claimed appearance of impropriety is to answer a different question: would the reasonable person knowing
and understanding all the facts and circumstances conclude
that the judge violated, or appeared to violate, the judicial code,
or engaged in other behavior calling into question the judge’s
ability or willingness to competently perform judicial duties
with impartiality, independence, and integrity?249
nary investigation was commenced as a result of the appellate court’s finding.
The opinion also does not explain why the appearance of impropriety standard
required the disqualification of the juror rather than the judge. In situations
where a judge’s relative is involved in proceedings before the judge as a witness, lawyer, or party, it is the judge, not the relative, who is disqualified. See
ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(d) (2009).
248. See Handler Letter, supra note 240, at 3 (“The Committee firmly believes, however, that the spirit of Canon 2 precludes the ability of a judge’s
spouse to serve as a juror in a matter over which the judge is presiding.”); cf.
Jeffrey M. Hayes, To Recuse or to Refuse: Self-Judging and the Reasonable
Person Problem, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 85, 99 (2008) (“[T]he reasonable person
standard often serves as a proxy for the judge’s own views . . . .”); Robert J.
Martineau, Disciplining Judges for Nonofficial Conduct: A Survey and Critique of the Law, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 245 (1981) (“It sometimes appears as
if particular courts have merely imposed their own moral standards of what is
or is not proper conduct.”).
249. The 2007 Code defines the appearance of impropriety as follows: “The
test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in
other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament or fitness to serve as a judge.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2007). The 1990 Code included a slightly different test. See
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt. (1990) (“The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable
minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities
with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.”). Ostensibly, the
New Jersey Advisory Committee employed this reasonable-person test. See
Handler Letter, supra note 240, at 2 (finding that the “average person” would
view Mrs. Smithson’s jury service as reflecting adversely on the judge’s objectivity, thereby undermining public confidence in the judiciary).
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In addressing this question the fully informed observer in
the Smithson matter would know that (1) the judge’s wife was
called to the courtroom randomly; (2) neither attorney requested that Ms. Smithson be excused; (3) Ms. Smithson was
identified as a an alternate juror and did not deliberate with
the jury; (4) ethical rules require that a judge not afford special
treatment to relatives;250 (5) ethical rules prohibit a judge from
hearing a case in which his or her spouse is a party, witness, or
lawyer, but say nothing about a spouse’s service as a juror;251
and (6) the defendant did not raise the issue of the judge’s
wife’s jury service at trial or on appeal. Under these facts, a
reasonable person would be hard pressed to conclude that
Judge Smithson violated, or appeared to violate, a code provision, or that the engaged in conduct adversely impacted his honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness for judicial office.
Because “of the lack of direct guidance in the [New Jersey]
Code of Judicial Conduct,”252 the Advisory Committee declined
to recommend the commencement of disciplinary proceedings
against Judge Smithson.253 But as grateful as a judge would be
to escape a reprimand or censure, the damage to the judge’s
reputation, the financial and emotional drain, and the message
to the public that yet another judge “violated” his oath and the
250. The New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a] judge
should not allow family, social, political, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment.” N.J. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B
(2009). Most judges understand this provision to mandate that family members must receive no special treatment from the court system. Judge Smithson
was acutely aware of this professional norm. See Letter from Andrew J.
Smithson, Judge, Superior Court of New Jersey, to Patrick J. Monahan, Jr.,
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Conduct (June 9, 2006), available at https://www
.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/acjcajs.pdf (“[A]ny unilateral action on my part
to excuse [my wife] would have been a violation of Cannon [sic] 2.B as I would
have allowed a family relationship to influence my conduct and judgment.”).
251. See N.J. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(d) (2009) (mandating a judge’s disqualification from a proceeding in which the judge’s spouse or
other relative is involved as a party, witness, or lawyer, but not requiring
similar action when a family member of a judge is a prospective juror); see also
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(2) (2007) (including a provision
similar to Canon 3E(1) of the New Jersey Code but adding “domestic partner”
to the class of individuals requiring the judge’s recusal).
252. Handler Letter, supra note 240, at 3.
253. Id. The Advisory Committee also declined to recommend disciplinary
action because of the considerable time that had elapsed between the trial and
the Committee’s investigation. Id. The Committee indicated that it would
communicate with the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts regarding the issuance of an Administrative Directive instructing judges how to
handle the issue of spousal jury service. Id. at 3.
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code of ethics, remains.254 Additionally, the Committee’s decision generates new questions for judges to address at their peril. May a judge’s parent,255 child, or in-laws serve as a juror before the judge?256 Is it permissible for a judge’s spouse to serve
on another judge’s jury?257 Should a state supreme court justice
be permitted to sit as a juror, or does the justice’s service create
a risk of improper jury influence even greater than that of a
judge’s spouse?258 Most likely, fear of creating an appearance of
impropriety will lead judges to “steer far wide[] of the unlawful
zone.”259
B. BENEFITS
The major benefit attributed to the appearance prohibition—providing a basis for charging judges with misconduct not
specifically outlawed by other code provisions—is discussed in
Part III.B.1. Another claimed advantage, the use of appearances as a bargaining chip to facilitate negotiated judicial disciplinary dispositions, is discussed in Part III.B.2. In actuality,
neither purported benefit advances the goal of enhancing public
confidence in the judiciary.
1. The Appearance of Impropriety as a Safety Net
The primary argument offered in support of a disciplinary
rule based on appearances proceeds as follows: the judicial

254. The proceedings before the New Jersey Advisory Committee were
made public at the request of Judge Smithson. See Press Release, N.J. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Conduct (May 29, 2007), available at http://www
.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/acjcajs.pdf.
255. See State v. Tody, 764 N.W.2d 737, 747–48 (Wis. 2009) (ordering a
new trial because the judge’s mother was a juror). The Tody opinion does not
indicate whether the matter was referred to a judicial disciplinary body.
256. The legislature could easily clarify the propriety of a judge’s family
member serving as a juror by enacting a rule on the subject. For example, New
York law disqualifies anyone from sitting as a juror who is related within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a defendant, victim, witness, or
prosecutor in the case. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(c) (McKinney 2002).
Judges could easily be added to the list.
257. See People v. Collins, 478 N.E.2d 267, 283 (Ill. 1985) (concluding that
defense attorneys made a strategic decision to permit the wife of a judge not
presiding over the trial to become a jury member).
258. New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Deborah Poritz served as a
juror during her second year as Chief Justice. Peter Lattman, Law Blog Q&A
with Drinker Biddle’s Deborah Poritz, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG, Dec. 14, 2006,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/14/law-blog-qa-with-deborah-poritz.
259. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
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branch survives only because the public trusts the system.260
Judges symbolize the justice system and its essential components—independence, impartiality, and integrity.261 Thus, confidence in the administration of justice is synonymous with confidence in judges. This all-important confidence is undermined
by any conduct which diminishes society’s belief in, or respect
for, the independence, impartiality, fairness, integrity, honesty,
uprightness, dignity, or moral character of judges.262 A judge’s
boorish, offensive, dishonest, immoral, or undignified conduct,
in or out of court, lessens respect for the judge and the entire
judiciary and therefore must be prohibited. Because there is no
way to conceive, much less list, every potential improper deed a
judge may commit, a broad, all-inclusive standard must be established against which the propriety of a judge’s behavior is
measured.263 Accordingly, codes of judicial conduct prohibit
judges from engaging in any “impropriety.”264
But preventing actual wrongdoing, the argument continues, is insufficient to protect public confidence because
“[a]voiding the appearance of impropriety is as important to
developing public confidence in the judiciary as avoiding im-

260. See, e.g., In re Ferrara, 582 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Mich. 1998) (“The effectiveness of our judicial system is dependent upon the public’s trust.”); Judicial
Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Shull, 651 S.E.2d 648, 658 (Va. 2007) (recognizing that the legal system depends on the public’s respect and confidence);
JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 10.03, at 10-4 (4th
ed. 2007) (discussing the need for public confidence in the judiciary and concluding that “[i]f this confidence were lost, the judicial system could not function”).
261. See In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 2007) (“Judges stand at
the pinnacle of the justice system, and each judge . . . represents the face of
justice.”).
262. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (2007) (“Conduct
that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary.”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 cmt. (1990) (“Public confidence in the
judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges.”).
263. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (2007) (“Because
it is not practicable to list all [improper] conduct, the Rule [prohibiting impropriety and the appearance of impropriety] is necessarily cast in general
terms.”); ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 30 (2004) (stating
that the rule against impropriety and the appearance of impropriety is cast in
general terms because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts).
264. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990) (“A
judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the
judge’s activities.”); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972) (“A judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.”).
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propriety itself.”265 Therefore, judicial codes must prohibit conduct that even appears suspect. Of course, there is no way to
identify every possible act that creates a bad appearance, so
judicial codes employ the nonspecific prohibition against the
“appearance of impropriety.”266 By barring every conceivable
and inconceivable impropriety, in fact and in appearance, the
public is assured that any behavior inimical to trust and confidence in the judiciary will be prevented or at least punished.
Nothing will slip through the cracks in the specific code prohibitions.
The argument that a prohibition against the appearance of
impropriety is needed to provide a basis for charging misconduct that otherwise would slip through the cracks267 is undercut by the fact that proponents,268 and opponents,269 of the appearance standard, as well as neutral observers,270 agree that
seldom is a judge punished solely on the basis of appearances.
The overwhelming majority of cases finding a judge guilty of an
improper appearance also find that the judge violated a more
specific code provision. For example, according to the website of
the Indiana Judicial Qualifications Commission, the Indiana
Supreme Court issued thirty-six published disciplinary decisions between 1987 and 2007.271 Ten of the opinions refer gen265. In re Dean, 717 A.2d 176, 184 (Conn. 1998); see also In re Greenberg,
280 A.2d 370, 372 (Pa. 1971) (“Without the appearance as well as the fact of
justice, respect for the law vanishes in a democracy.”).
266. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007).
267. See Kathleen Maher, Keeping Up Appearances, 16 PROF. LAW. 1, 15
(2005) (“[S]ome jurisdictions still find [the appearance of impropriety standard] useful when a judge or lawyer engages in unethical conduct that does
not fit nicely into any other Rule or Code provision.”).
268. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 23, at 67 (“Although in most judicial discipline cases, a judge is charged with violating a specific canon such as the prohibition on ex parte communications, there are cases based on findings of an appearance of a violation.”).
269. See, e.g., Patricia Manson, Debate over Ethics Heats Up as Confab
Opens, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 8, 2007, at 24 (“Creating the appearance of
impropriety seldom appears as a stand-alone charge in disciplinary cases
brought under the current [1990] code. . . . It’s a charge which is thrown in,
but is never or rarely the sole basis for discipline . . . .” (quoting Mark I. Harrison, Chair of the Joint Commission)).
270. Maher, supra note 267, at 14 (“While the ‘appearance of impropriety’
has been the sole basis for discipline in some cases, it is usually used in conjunction with another Canon when charging a judge with misconduct.”).
271. See Indiana Supreme Court Judicial Disciplinary Opinions, http://
www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-qual/dis-opinions.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2010). All
Indiana disciplinary proceedings referred to in this Article were decided under
judicial codes in effect prior to January 1, 2009.
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erally to the appearance of impropriety prohibition or specifically find that a judge violated the standard.272 But none of the
thirty-six Indiana disciplinary orders relies solely on the appearance of impropriety.273 Each opinion finds a code violation
other than the prohibition against improper appearances.274
The Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics,275 which governed
the conduct of state judges from 1968 until 1997, did not contain a disciplinary or aspirational provision regarding the appearance of impropriety.276 There is no indication that the ab272. The ten opinions are: In re Kouros, 816 N.E.2d 21, 29 (Ind. 2004) (finding the judge violated Canons 1, 2, and 3(B)(9) of the Indiana Code); In re Jacobi, 715 N.E.2d 873, 875 (Ind. 1999) (finding a violation of Canons 1, 2(A),
and 3(B)(2)); In re Johnson, 715 N.E.2d 370, 371–72 (Ind. 1999) (finding a violation of Canons 1, 2(A), and 3(B)(8)); In re McClain, 662 N.E.2d 935, 944
(Ind. 1996) (finding that the judge’s role in sending his used condom with a
vulgar letter to a court employee violated Canon 1 by failing to preserve the
integrity of the judiciary and violated Canon 2(A) by failing to promote public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary); In re Goodman, 649 N.E.2d 115,
116 (Ind. 1995) (finding a violation of Canons 2A, 3B(2), and 3B(4)); In re Sallee, 579 N.E.2d 75, 76 (Ind. 1991) (finding a violation of Canons 1, 2, and
7A(1)(c)); In re Sauce, 561 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ind. 1990) (finding that the judge’s
ex parte communications violated Canons 1 and 2(A) and that his off-color,
threatening comments violated Canon 2(A) “in that he failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety and did not conduct himself in a manner that promoted public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary”); In re Hammond, 559
N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ind. 1990) (finding a violation of Canons 2 and 5); In re Boles,
555 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ind. 1990) (finding a violation of Canons 2, 3, and 7);
and In re Katic, 549 N.E.2d 1039, 1040 (Ind. 1990) (finding a violation of Canons 1, 2, and 7).
273. See disciplinary actions cited supra note 272. Interestingly, the phrase
“appearance of impropriety” does not appear in the seven most recent Indiana
disciplinary orders. See In re Hawkins, 902 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. 2009); In re Felts,
902 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2009); In re Scheibenberger, 899 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 2009);
In re Hanley, 867 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. 2007); In re Newman, 858 N.E.2d 632 (Ind.
2006); In re Cruz, 851 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 2006); In re Pfaff, 838 N.E.2d 1022
(Ind. 2005). The phrase, however, may make a comeback in future disciplinary
orders since Indiana’s most recent code of judicial conduct, effective January 1,
2009, includes a specific disciplinary rule prohibiting conduct which creates an
appearance of impropriety. IND. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009).
274. See disciplinary actions cited supra note 272.
275. WIS. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1968). The Wisconsin Code of Judicial
Ethics is reproduced in In re Code of Judicial Ethics, 153 N.W.2d 873, 875–78
(Wis. 1967).
276. Enacted in 1967, the original Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics included “standards” intended to serve as advisory “statements of what the general desirable level of conduct should be” and separately designated rules “the
violation of which shall subject an individual judge to sanctions.” In re Code of
Judicial Ethics, 153 N.W.2d at 874. No appearance of impropriety clause was
included in the Code. Id. at 875–78. Standard 3 of the Code brought appearances into play to a limited extent by providing that a judge “should administer the law free of partiality and the appearance of partiality.” Id. at 875. The
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sence of the appearance standard hampered judicial discipline
in Wisconsin.277 Canon 3 of the successor Wisconsin Code of
Judicial Conduct does include a prohibition against the appearance of impropriety,278 but reported disciplinary cases do
not reveal its use as an independent basis for discipline.279
North Carolina, since removing any mention of the appearance
of impropriety standard from its code of judicial conduct in
2003,280 has not lost the ability to sanction judges for such di-

accompanying Rules provided that an aggravated or persistent violation of a
standard could rise to the level of a rule violation. Id. at 878. But the appearance of partiality was never used as the sole basis for discipline. See, e.g., In re
Carver, 531 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Wis. 1995) (finding that the judge violated four
standards of judicial conduct including the obligation to administer the law
without partiality or the appearance of partiality); In re Breitenbach, 482
N.W.2d 52, 56–57 (Wis. 1992) (disciplining a judge for, among other things,
intemperate, rude, and discourteous conduct in violation of the duty to avoid
the appearance of partiality and five other standards of judicial conduct). Decisions applying the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics occasionally mentioned
the appearance of impropriety but only in the context of explaining the rationale behind the enactment of specific prohibitions. See, e.g., In re Seraphim,
294 N.W.2d 485, 499 (Wis. 1980) (explaining that the rule prohibiting the acceptance of gifts from persons whose interests were likely to come before the
judge was based on the need to prevent improper appearances).
277. “Reported Judicial Disciplinary Public Cases” are collected at the Wisconsin Judicial Commission’s website. See Public Cases, http://www.wicourts
.gov/about/committees/judicialcommission/publiccases.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2010).
278. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.03 (“A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.”).
279. See, e.g., In re Ziegler, 750 N.W.2d 710, 723 (Wis. 2008) (“Judge Ziegler’s [failure to disqualify from cases in which her spouse served as a director
of a party] violated not only the plain language of the Code but also a principal
underlying the Code: Judges should avoid partiality and even the appearance
of partiality.”); In re Crawford, 629 N.W.2d 1, 8–9 (Wis. 2001) (citing the Wisconsin Code provision prohibiting improper appearances but finding that an
attempt to coerce the chief judge to vacate an administrative order by threatening disclosure of personal family matters is an actual impropriety). According to the Wisconsin Judicial Commission website, seven public disciplinary
opinions have been issued since adoption of the Wisconsin Code of Judicial
Conduct in 1997. See Public Cases, supra note 277 (citing Ziegler, 750 N.W.2d
at 710; In re Laatsch, 727 N.W.2d 488 (Wis. 2007); In re Crawford, 629 N.W.2d
1 (Wis. 2001); In re Waddick, 605 N.W.2d 861 (Wis. 2000); In re Michelson, 591
N.W.2d 843 (Wis. 1999); In re Stern, 589 N.W.2d 407 (1999); and In re Tesmer,
589 N.W.2d 307 (Wis. 1998)).
280. See N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2009) (“A judge should
avoid impropriety in all his activities.”). Prior to being amended in 2003, Canon 2 of the North Carolina Code provided that “[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.” N.C. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1991); accord Lange v. Lange, 605 S.E.2d 732,
736 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
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verse conduct as the uninvited touching of a paralegal,281 the
filing of a complaint claiming that attorneys and judges conspired to assassinate the judge,282 and pushing and yelling at
an elevator passenger.283 Oregon abandoned the appearance-ofimpropriety standard in 1996.284 On the federal level, the canons of judicial conduct governing United States judges (including a provision prohibiting the appearance of impropriety) have
historically been viewed as establishing aspirational guides and
not disciplinary rules.285
Notwithstanding the fact that many jurisdictions have successfully addressed judicial misconduct without the need to
resort to appearances, proponents of the standard identify several types of confidence-damaging behavior that purportedly
are not governed by specific code provisions. It is argued that
these behaviors would go unpunished without the option of an
appearance-based charge. The following subsections examine
three of these professed areas of unregulated judicial misconduct.
a. Personal Relationships with Criminals
It is suggested that the appearance standard provides a
basis for disciplining a judge who damages public confidence by
281. See In re Daisy, 614 S.E.2d 529, 531 (N.C. 2005) (finding that the unwanted touching violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3A(3) of the North Carolina Code
of Judicial Conduct).
282. See In re Harrison, 611 S.E.2d 834, 836 (N.C. 2005) (finding that the
bizarre conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, 3A(6), and 7(B)(2) of the North Carolina Code).
283. See In re Hill, 609 S.E.2d 221, 223 (N.C. 2005) (finding that the elevator episode and the improper remarks in court violated Canons 1, 2A, 3A(2),
and 3A(3) of the North Carolina Code).
284. OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2002) (omitting the appearance of
impropriety provision which had appeared in previous versions of the Oregon
Code); see also OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1975) (“A Judge
Should Avoid the Appearance of Impropriety In All His Activities.”); OR. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 4 (1952) (“A judge’s official conduct should be
free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”).
285. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279, 282
(9th Cir. 2009) (describing the Code of Conduct as “in many potential applications aspirational rather than a set of disciplinary rules”); In re Complaint of
Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1202 (9th Cir. 2005) (Winmill, J., dissenting) (“Of course, the Canons are only guidelines, and so not all violations of the
Canons amount to misconduct.”); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d
320, 322 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The Canons are aspirational goals . . . .”); An Interview with Judge M. Margaret McKeown, THIRD BRANCH, July 2009, at 10, 12
(“Our Code [of Conduct for United States Judges] remains advisory and aspirational.”).
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engaging in a close relationship with a convicted criminal.286
But identifying a judge who has been disciplined for no more
than a close association with a lawbreaker is as difficult as defining the phrase “appearance of impropriety.” Most decisions
imposing punishment for an ongoing relationship with a crime
figure do so not on the basis of the social or personal relationship, but because the judge provided advice to, or accepted gifts
or favors from, the offender.287 The authors of Judicial Conduct
and Ethics state that “[a]lthough numerous dicta indicate that
judges may be disciplined merely for ‘close and intimate association’ with criminals, there appears to be only one reported instance of punishment being imposed in the absence of palpable
misconduct.”288 The authors add that even in that case, involving former Rhode Island Chief Justice Joseph Bevilacqua, the
precise acts for which the judge was disciplined are unknown
because no official decision was rendered and the record of the
proceedings remains confidential.289 However, newspaper articles appearing at the time of the Bevilacqua investigation indicate that the receipt of gifts and favors may have played a
role in the judge’s suspension.290
In re Harris291 is sometimes cited in support of the proposition that an appearance prohibition is needed to regulate associations with felons.292 But the discipline imposed on Judge
Harris hardly needed to be justified by appearances.
286. See Gray, supra note 23, at 81; Speakers Urge Commission to Eschew
Drastic Rewrite of Judicial Conduct Code, 72 U.S.L.W. 2611, 2611 (2004)
(summarizing testimony before the Joint Commission suggesting that the appearance-of-impropriety standard was necessary to discipline a judge having
“an [extramarital] affair with a felon that the judge previously sentenced”).
287. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 260, § 10.05B, at 10-24.
288. Id. at 10-24 to 10-25. The disciplinary action referred to is the Rhode
Island Commission on Judicial Tenure’s suspension of Joseph Bevilacqua in
1985. Id. at 10–25 n.155. At the time of Justice Bevilacqua’s suspension, a review of disciplinary decisions around the country disclosed that “[o]nly seven
other judges had been disciplined for their associations with criminals, and in
all but one of the cases, there was additional evidence of wrongdoing, such as
accepting gifts or favors.” Rhode Island Chief Justice Suspended, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Spring 1985, at 2, 6.
289. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 260, § 10.05B, at 10-25 n.155.
290. See, e.g., Ken Franckling, Photos at Mob-Linked Motel Further Harm
Judge’s Image, MIAMI HERALD, May 13, 1985, at 2A (reporting that Judge Bevilacqua loaded several boxes into his car while at a wholesale food warehouse
owned by a convicted felon with no money passing hands, and reporting that
the judge engaged in midday and evening one-hour visits with women at a motel owned by persons allegedly linked to drug smuggling).
291. 713 So. 2d 1138 (La. 1998).
292. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 23, at 81. In re Blackman is also cited in
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In that case, Judge Harris not only associated publically with a
known felon, she entered into an extramarital affair with a felon who
pleaded guilty in her court and was illegally sentenced by her for his
criminal act, which allowed the felon to be paroled. . . . Toward the
end of their extramarital affairs, the convicted felon engaged in a
crime spree in East Baton Rouge Parish, including car theft, burglary
of an inhabited dwelling, and armed robberies of two fast food outlets
and a shoe store before his parole was revoked.293

Assuming that a tool is necessary to govern a judge’s relationships, enacting a rule is a more efficient and fair method of
accomplishing that goal as opposed to a random application of
the appearance standard. The public vetting attendant to the
rulemaking process is especially important when privacy and
freedom of association concerns are present and where the bias
that “friendships suggest may be so innocent as to preclude
significant regulation.”294 If a rulemaking body concludes that
close association with criminals should be prohibited, a code
provision to that effect can be adopted. Even a general rule
providing, for example, that “a judge shall not knowingly engage in a close or intimate personal relationship, or social relationship, or business relationship, with a non-relative charged
with or convicted of a felony or other crime involving moral
turpitude,” would provide some guidance.295 A rule not only
adds specificity but also transforms the ethics problem from
one of appearances to one of realities. With a specific rule the
question becomes, does the judge maintain a prohibited relationship? Under the appearance standard a judge is subject to
discipline for either (1) actually engaging in a prohibited relasupport of the proposition that the appearance standard provides a basis upon
which to punish associations with criminals. 591 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991). But
Blackman is of limited value outside of New Jersey. Unlike most states, New
Jersey, when evaluating appearances created by public contact between a
judge and a criminal, does not view the situation through the lens of the reasonable, fully informed observer. At least where criminal associations are involved, the issue in New Jersey is not whether a reasonable person would conclude that a judge appeared to commit an impropriety, “but whether there is a
fair possibility that some portion of the public might become concerned on that
score.” Id. at 1342 (internal citation omitted); see also supra note 194.
293. In re Miller, 949 So. 2d 379, 399 (La. 2007) (Knoll, J., dissenting) (describing the facts in In re Harris).
294. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 258, § 10.05B, at 10-25.
295. The author is not suggesting such a rule. After all, a rule prohibiting
relationships with felons would prevent a judge, for instance, from maintaining a close association with Martha Stewart or Charles Colson. See United
States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 288–89 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the felony
convictions of the doyenne of domesticity); In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (relying on a felony conviction to disbar a former White House Aide
to President Richard Nixon).
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tionship or (2) appearing to engage in such a relationship without actually doing so.
b. Misuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office
Codes of judicial conduct specifically prohibit a judge from
using the prestige of judicial office to obtain a private benefit
for the judge or a third party. For example, Rule 1.3 of the 2007
Code provides that “[a] judge shall not abuse the prestige of
judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of
the judge or others, or allow others to do so.”296 Notwithstanding these explicit rules, it is claimed that the appearance standard is needed to charge indirect or subtle attempts to exploit
the judicial office.297 But that is simply not the case. Rule 1.3
and similar rules in state codes are not limited to in-your-face
attempts to misuse judicial power or prestige. A judge who in
any manner gratuitously interjects his or her judicial status in
nonofficial dealings with law enforcement officials, school officials, insurance agents, neighbors, judges, or anyone else commits an actual impropriety in violation of these rules. Thus, an
impropriety in fact is committed when a judge, after being
stopped for a traffic violation, states to the officer “Do you know
who I am?,”298 or displays a judicial identification card299 or
badge,300 or repeatedly advises the officer of his or her judicial
status.301

296. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).
297. See Gray, supra note 23, at 67–80.
298. In re Heiple (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Apr. 30, 1997) (order) (finding that Justice Heiple responded to a police officer’s instructions during a traffic stop by
stating, “Do you know who I am?”); In re Garza, 161 P.3d 876, 870 (N.M. 2007)
(removing judge for asking a traffic enforcement officer “Do you know who I
am?”); cf. In re Sasso, No. ACJC 2007-162, at 4 (N.J. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Conduct Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/Sasso%
20Presentment.pdf (finding that Judge Sasso improperly responded to inquiries from Torpedo’s Go-Go Bar employees by stating “Do you know who I am?”
and “You don’t know who I am?”).
299. Werner (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 1, 2002) (determination), http://scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/W/Werner.htm (finding judge
violated Canon 1 and Canon 2 of the New York Code of Judicial Conduct by
gratuitously interjecting his judicial status into a traffic stop by offering his
judicial identification card to the officer).
300. Travis (Ill. Cts. Comm’n Feb. 21, 2003) (order).
301. Rushing, at 5 (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance June 8, 2006)
(decision and order), http://cjp.ca.gov/userfiles/file/Censures/Rushing_06-08
-06.pdf (finding that the judge repeatedly invoked her judicial status, and that
of her husband, in an attempt to avoid arrest).
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Even where a specific request for favorable treatment is
not communicated, there is no need to invoke appearances because exploitation of the judicial office is inferred from the circumstances. For example, a judge who merely inquires of
another judge about a friend’s traffic citation,302 or sends a letter on court stationery to a school official concerning the expulsion of the judge’s son,303 commits a wrong in actuality, not in
perception. While it is true that many disciplinary decisions involving the exploitation of the judicial office pay homage to appearances,304 such references are generally no more than window dressing because specific rules prohibiting the misuse of
judicial prestige are also cited in support of the discipline imposed.305 Most significantly, numerous disciplinary decisions
sanction judges for misusing judicial status in subtle, nonblatant ways without any mention of the appearance of improprie-

302. See, e.g., In re Magill (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 6,
2004) (determination), http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/M/Magill.htm
(finding that a judge interjected judicial prestige into his wife and daughter’s
case by delivering the court file together with his business card to the judge
handling the matter); In re Jarrell (N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n Aug. 14,
2007) (public reprimand), http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/jsc/public
reprimands/jsc06-233.pdf (finding judge’s use of a business card in a private
matter evidenced an intent to misuse the prestige of office).
303. In re Nesbitt (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 21, 2002)
(determination), http://www.scjc.ny.us/Determinations/N/Nesbitt.htm.
304. Gray, supra note 23, at 68 (“More subtle, less bald-faced but still manifest attempts to gain an improper advantage from the judicial office are captured by the appearance of impropriety standard and represent the largest
number of cases finding an appearance of impropriety.”).
305. See, e.g., Simpson (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance Dec. 9, 2002)
(decision and order), http://cjp.ca.gov/userfiles/file/Censures/Simpson_12-9
-02.pdf (finding that contacting government officials regarding a friend’s ticket
violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B(1), 2B(2), and 3E of the California Code); In re
Harned, 357 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa 1984) (relying on Canons 1 and 2 of the Iowa
Code in disciplining a judge for contacting a magistrate about the judge’s
daughter’s traffic citation); In re Snow, 674 A.2d 573, 577–79 (N.H. 1996) (paying lip service to the importance of avoiding the appearance of impropriety but
basing discipline on the fact that the judge, in contacting a police officer regarding a relative’s ticket, lent the prestige of office to promote a private undertaking in violation of Canon 2A and 2B of the New Hampshire Code); In re
Rivera-Soto, 927 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J. 2007) (censuring judge based on the findings and recommendation contained in the presentment of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct); Rivera-Soto, at 4 (N.J. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Conduct July 11, 2007) (presentment), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/
pressrel/D-140-06%20RiveraSoto%20Presentment.pdf. (finding that Judge
Rivera-Soto violated New Jersey Canons 1, 2A, and 2B by distributing official
business cards to police and directly calling the county prosecutor regarding a
family legal matter).
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ty.306 Simply put, the ability to discipline a judge for actions
that (1) imply that the judge is exploiting official prestige or (2)
create an unacceptable risk that the judge’s office could be a
factor in how others deal with the judge in his or her personal
capacity,307 would not suffer one bit if the appearance standard
did not exist.
c. Favoritism in Appointments
Proponents of the appearance standard suggest its usefulness in situations where it appears that a judge has hired or
appointed an individual on a basis other than merit, but direct
evidence of actual favoritism or nepotism is lacking. As subsection (i) will show, most cases cited in support of this claim308
contain conclusive proof of actual favoritism, but the disciplin306. See, e.g., In re Harned, 357 N.W.2d at 301 (finding letter on official
stationery and telephone call to magistrate assigned to the judge’s daughter’s
ticket a misuse of prestige without discussing appearances); In re Mosley, 102
P.3d 555, 559 (Nev. 2004) (finding no need to discuss appearances where a
judge wrote letters on judicial stationery to his son’s school for the purpose of
gaining an advantage); In re Samay, 764 A.2d 398, 407 (N.J. 2001) (finding
judge’s use of the judicial title in a letter to his son’s school violated New Jersey Canons 1, 2A, and 2B without discussing appearances); Quall, at 6 (Cal.
Comm’n on Judicial Performance June 4, 2008) (decision and order), http://
cjp.ca.gov/userfiles/file/Public_Admon/Quall_DO_6-2-08.pdf (concluding that
the use of judicial letterhead for charitable fund-raising constitutes misuse of
prestige without discussing appearances); Di Loreto, at 1 (Cal. Comm’n on
Judicial Performance June 13, 2006) (decision and order), http://cjp.ca.gov/
userfiles/file/Public_Admon/DiLoreto_DO_06-13-06.pdf (finding the use of
judicial stationery in a private dispute with the city building department misused the prestige of judicial office without discussing appearances); Krauciunas (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 18, 2002) (determination)
(finding a misuse of prestige where a judge made gratuitous references to his
judicial position when dealing with court personnel regarding his daughter’s
small claims case; the determination included no mention of the appearance of
impropriety); Cipolla (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Oct 1, 2002)
(determination), http://www.scjc.ny.us/Determinations/C/Cipolla.htm (disciplining judge for identifying himself as a judge in a dispute with night club employees and contacting another judge on behalf of a girlfriend’s speeding ticket
because such conduct, even in the absence of a specific request, constitutes the
misuse of judicial prestige; the decision containing no mention of the appearance of impropriety).
307. See In re Rivera-Soto, 927 A.2d at 112; In re Rivera-Soto (N.J. Advisory
Comm. on Judicial Conduct July 11, 2007) (presentment), http://www.judiciary
.state.nj.us/pressrel/D-140-06%20Rivera-Soto%20presentment.pdf (finding that
providing a judicial business card to a police officer and calling the county
prosecutor regarding a personal matter created a significant and unacceptable
risk that the judicial office would influence decisions made by the police and
prosecutor).
308. The three cases discussed in Part III.B.1.c are cited in Gray, supra
note 23, at 74 –77.
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ary body finds it easier or more expedient to rely on appearances. In re Spector, discussed in subsection (ii), is an exception. In that case, evidence of actual misconduct did not exist
and the only basis for discipline was a finding of an appearance
of favoritism. Spector, it is submitted, is another example309 of
a disciplinary proceeding in which the result was dictated more
by the subjective views of the decisionmakers than by application of the reasonable person test. In any event, the unique circumstances surrounding Spector render the decision of little
aid to appearance standard advocates.
i. Relying on Appearances Where Actual Favoritism Is
Demonstrated
Based on the following facts, the New York Commission on
Judicial Conduct censured Judge Ray,310 not for favoritism in
fact, but for creating the appearance that two court-appointed
guardians received favored treatment:
• Judge Ray circumvented established procedures in order
to give two guardians a “grossly disproportionate” number of appointments;311
• The judge approved, without reviewing, “grossly inflated
bills” which included double billing, fees for cases not assigned to the guardians, and billing for more court hours
than court was in session;312
• Judge Ray ignored the Chief Administrative Judge’s
warning regarding the guardians’ improper appointments and fees;313
• One guardian previously ran against Judge Ray for judicial office, but agreed not to oppose the judge in the next
election and further agreed to solicit political endorsements for the judge.314
The Commission’s finding that that the guardians appeared to receive favored treatment certainly is an understatement. This case warranted a finding of actual misconduct.
309. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the disciplinary investigation of
Judge Andrew Smithson).
310. In re Herbert B. Ray (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Apr. 26,
1999) (determination), http://www.scjc.state.ny.usDeterminations/R/Ray/ray,_
herbert.htm.
311. Id. at 3.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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Appearances are not necessary to capture the type of behavior
exhibited by Judge Ray.
In a comparable situation, Judge Feinberg was disciplined
for firing the Counsel to the King’s County, New York, Public
Administrator and hiring his close personal friend and political
supporter, Louis Rosenthal, to fill the vacancy.315 Judge Feinberg did not examine the billing statements submitted by Mr.
Rosenthal, did not give individual consideration to each fee request, failed to weigh statutory factors in setting fees, violated
agreements with the Attorney General’s office, ignored statutory requirements by granting fees in hundreds of cases without
a fee affidavit, and awarded his friend nearly $9,000,000 plus
extra compensation for real estate closings and referral fees.316
In another gross understatement, the Commission found that
the judge’s actions conveyed the appearance of being motivated
by favoritism. Indeed, the “appearance” was so bad that Judge
Feinberg was removed from office.317
Finally, in In re Johnstone,318 the judge was acquitted of
actual favoritism but was censured for creating the appearance
of favoritism by hiring a new coroner recommended at the last
minute by the coroner candidate’s good friend, the Chief Justice. At Judge Johnstone’s insistence, the candidate was interviewed by the merit screening committee after the application
deadline had passed and all qualified applicants had been
ranked.319 The candidate never completed the required application.320 Although the candidate ranked sixth of the ten individuals interviewed, the judge hired him without inquiring about
the reason for his low ranking.321 In order to allow the candidate to retain his existing retirement benefits, the judge,
against the court administrator’s advice, took the unusual step
of hiring the candidate as a temporary coroner appointee.322
315. In re Feinberg, 833 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (N.Y. 2005); In re Feinberg,
(N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Feb. 10, 2005) (determination), http://
www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/F/Feinberg/htm.
316. Feinberg, 833 N.E.2d at 1207.
317. Id. at 1210. On October 21, 2009, an order was entered in the Surrogate Court of King’s County vacating the attorney fees awarded to Louis Rosenthal by Judge Feinberg. In re Estate of Adelson, 25 Misc. 3d 1215, 1216
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
318. 2 P.3d 1226 (Alaska 2000).
319. Id. at 1236.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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The court found that the facts gave rise to an “overwhelming”
appearance of impropriety.323
Whatever the reasons for finding apparent rather than actual favoritism in Ray, Feinberg, and Johnstone, it was not due
to a lack of evidence. Findings of actual favoritism have been
based on far less.324 The appearance of impropriety should play
no role in disciplining judges for such outrageously improper
conduct.
ii. Spector and Fiduciary Appointments in New York
In re Spector325 is one of the rare cases in which a judge
was disciplined solely on the basis of improper appearances.
The eleven members of the New York Commission on Judicial
Conduct, the referee appointed by the commission, and all participating members of the court of appeals agreed that no actual impropriety occurred.326 The referee, eight of the eleven
members of the commission, and five of the six members of the
court of appeals found that Judge Spector created an appearance of impropriety by granting fiduciary appointments to the
sons of other judges while the fellow judges appointed Judge
Spector’s son to similar posts.327
Between March 1968 and November 1974, Judge Spector
appointed the son of Judge Sidney Fine to fiduciary positions
on two occasions and appointed the son of Judge Postel on ten
occasions. During the same period, Judge Spector’s son was appointed eight times by Judge Fine and ten times by Judge
Postel.328 As argued in the dissent, the appointments were inconsequential considering (1) their infrequency; (2) the thousands of similar appointments made at the trial level; (3) the
modest, customary fee (and in some cases no fee) received by
the fiduciaries; (4) the fact that each appointee was qualified
and completely fulfilled his responsibility; and (5) the lack of
any indication of a “quid pro quo” arrangement.329 Further, at
the time of the appointments, there was no rule or canon of eth323. Id. at 1236–37. Three of the eight Commissioners did find clear and
convincing evidence of an actual impropriety. Id. at 1237.
324. See, e.g., In re Fine, 13 P.3d 400, 411 (Nev. 2000).
325. 392 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y. 1979).
326. Id. at 552; In re Spector (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec.
14, 1978) (determination), http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/S/Spector
.htm.
327. Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 552.
328. Id. at 552–53.
329. Id. at 556–57 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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ics in New York that prohibited the appointment of relatives of
judges or that indicated that such selections might create an
appearance of impropriety.330 Nevertheless, the New York
Court of Appeals found that the cross-appointments “inescapably created a circumstantial appearance of impropriety.”331 On
a related charge, however, Judge Spector was found not to have
created an appearance of impropriety by granting a receivership appointment to a partner of the law firm employing Judge
Spector’s son.332
The court of appeals did not identify the test employed in
reaching its conclusion, but it is unlikely that the fully informed reasonable person’s perceptions were determinative.
The failure to evaluate Judge Spector’s conduct by the objective
observer’s appraisal of whether the judge’s conduct impaired
his ability to perform the judicial function with integrity, impartiality, and independence is not surprising since that standard was not yet developed by the ABA.333 In addition, the circumstances surrounding the fiduciary appointments were not
so egregious as to cause a reasonable person to question Judge
Spector’s integrity or impartiality.334
330. Id. at 557. This omission from the New York Code of Judicial Conduct
is significant because other states did enact rules prohibiting crossappointments by judges. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 61(c)(11) (“A judge should
avoid nepotism and action tending to create suspicion of impropriety. He
should not offend against the spirit of this standard by interchanging appointments with other judges . . . .”).
331. Spector, 392 N.E.2d at 555.
332. In re Spector, at 2 (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 14,
1978) (determination), http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/S/Spector
.htm.
333. The 1972 Model Code did not define the phrase “appearance of impropriety.” See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972). The 1990
Code defined the appearance of impropriety to include conduct that would
“create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out
judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt. (1990). The New
York Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted in 1996, included the reasonable person test of the 1990 Model Code. N.Y. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2
cmt. (1996). Prior to the adoption of the 1996 New York Code, some state
judges employed a similar reasonable person test in evaluating the propriety
of a judge’s conduct. See, e.g., In re Fuchsberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 639, 653 (1978)
(Suozzi, J., concurring) (“I cannot believe, given the complete facts as to this
transaction, that a fair-minded person or public would have perceived it as an
instance of special privilege or judicial impropriety.”).
334. This is especially true since discipline was imposed for crossappointing relatives in both compensated and noncompensated cases. A reasonable person would have, at least, parsed out the appointments in which the
judges’ relatives in effect donated fiduciary services. It is difficult to objectively
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Most probably, the Spector outcome was dictated by the
subjective view of the members of the Commission and court of
appeals, rather than an application of the reasonable person
test. Operating on a clean slate, even the purely subjective assessment of the commissioners and appellate judges would likely have been less critical. But no one was operating on a clean
slate. Favoritism in fiduciary appointments had long been a
common and criticized practice in New York.335 Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s father, for instance, “clearly used his appointing
power for political and personal patronage purposes principally
benefiting his nephew.”336 Judge Albert Cardozo resigned in order to avoid impeachment on these and other charges.337 One
hundred years later, shortly before the Spector proceedings, the
New York Times complained that close relatives of judges in
Bronx and Manhattan (including Judges Fine, Postel, and
Spector) received 460 appointments as guardians, receivers,
and referees in a nine-year period.338 And despite the fact that
Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye “has struggled heroically to control
favoritism,”339 fiduciary appointment and oversight problems
continue in the Empire State.340
find an appearance of favoritism where the recipient of the “favor” works for
free. Even today New York permits a judge’s relative to be appointed as a noncompensated fiduciary. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(b)(3)
(2008). Additionally, any objective observer finding an appearance of impropriety in Judge Spector’s cross-appointments would surely find equal culpability in his act of appointing, as a receiver, a partner of the law firm in which
the judge’s son was employed. Yet, neither the commission nor the court found
any appearance of impropriety in that conduct. Spector, at 2 (N.Y. State
Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 14, 1978) (determination), http://www.scjc
.state.ny.us/Determinations/S/Spector.htm.
335. Andrew Kaufman, The First Judge Cardozo: Albert, Father of Benjamin, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 271, 296 (1994 –95) (“Favoritism in appointments was
a common practice in New York and elsewhere.”).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 310; COMM’N ON FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENTS, STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENTS (2001), reprinted in
N.Y. State Bar Association, Report of the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 38, 38 (2002) [hereinafter Report on Fiduciary Appointments] (stating that Judge Albert Cardozo was forced to leave the bench
in large part because of his repeated appointment of relatives and political
cronies as fiduciaries).
338. Howard Blum, Relatives of 9 New York Justices Received $526,353 in
Court Fees, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1977, at L1; see also Report on Fiduciary Appointments, supra note 337 (finding extensive and significant flaws in the fiduciary appointment system).
339. Editorial, Friends of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at CY11.
340. See Kraham v. Lippman, 478 F.3d 502, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding
the New York rule prohibiting political party officials, their families, and their
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Regardless of the objective or subjective nature of the test
employed in Spector, New York’s special circumstances dictated
the result. The case is little support for the general proposition
that the appearance standard is necessary to plug the gap
where proof of actual favoritism is lacking.341 The best method
to protect against the improper selection of judicial appointees,
in fact or perception, is to enact a rule, not to stretch the appearance standard.342 And enacting a rule is exactly what New
York did seven years after Spector.343
2. The Appearance of Impropriety as a Bargaining Chip
The appearance of impropriety prohibition is sometimes
employed “as a lesser included offense that facilities ‘plea’ bargains in disciplinary proceedings.”344 A judge confronted with
disciplinary charges based on serious acts of misconduct may
avoid or minimize a finding of actual impropriety by admitting
to only an appearance of wrongdoing.345 Some commentators
commend the use of the appearance standard as a bargaining
law firms from receiving fiduciary appointments); N.Y. ST. UNIFIED COURT
SYSTEM, FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENTS IN NEW YORK: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE AND CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN, Executive Summary (2001), available at http://nycourts.gov/ip/gfs/ig
fiduciary.html (“Despite the extensive problems found, we are confident that
significant reform of the fiduciary appointment process is underway.”); Daniel
Wise, Trio of Democrats Square off in Race for Manhattan Surrogate, N.Y. L.J,
Aug. 21, 2008, at 1 (“[A]ll three [New York judicial] candidates stressed the
need to take steps to end the public perception that patronage is involved in
the many appointments surrogates are required to make.”).
341. For a contrary view see Nancy J. Moore, Is the Appearance of Impropriety an Appropriate Standard for Disciplining Judges in the Twenty-First
Century?, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 296–97 (2010).
342. See infra Part IV.B.
343. See Report on Fiduciary Appointments, supra note 337, at 41 (“The
new rules, Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Judge, . . . effect[ive] on April 1,
1986 . . . . [g]overned [the appointment] of guardians, guardians ad litem, conservators, committees for the incompetent, receivers and persons designated
to perform services for a receiver . . . . Part 36 rendered ineligible for appointment any known relative of any judge of the Unified Court System, whether by
blood or marriage.”). For the current version of Part 36, see N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36 (2008).
344. Gray, supra note 23, at 77 (internal quotations omitted).
345. Admitting responsibility for creating an improper appearance appeals
to some judges because it is a simple and inexpensive method of avoiding a
disciplinary hearing. See Pam Louwagie, Judge is Scolded for His Handling of
Two Drunken-Driving Cases, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 21, 2007, at 1B
(“He [the judge] decided, I’m sure, that it was much simpler and cheaper to
merely stipulate that there might have been the appearance of impropriety
and get it over with.” (quoting the judge’s attorney)).
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chip because it allows a judge to save face346 and serves as a
“useful conflict avoidance” device.347
Whether appearance-based plea bargaining is a benefit or
a detriment to maintaining confidence in the judiciary is open
to serious question. Even in the realm of criminal law, plea negotiations are not looked upon favorably. As observed by Professors Bradley and Hoffman, “[p]erhaps the least popular facet
of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the American public is the widespread practice of plea bargaining.”348 There is no
reason to believe that negotiated dispositions are less offensive
in judicial discipline cases where the accused, unlike the usual
criminal defendant, holds the public trust. Indeed, there is
some anecdotal evidence indicating that society’s reaction is
more critical where a judge is the beneficiary of a plea agreement, even if the judge abandons his or her office as part of the
deal.349 But more important than the underlying distrust of
plea-bargaining is the fact that the pressures of the criminal
justice system necessitating, or at least explaining, plea negotiations are not present in matters of judicial discipline.

346. Gray, supra note 23, at 77 (“In an agreed disposition, the appearance
of impropriety standard gives the judge a face-saving way to admit with the
benefit of hindsight to apparently committing misconduct without having to
admit to actually meaning to do anything wrong.”); see also ABA/BNA, Appearance of Impropriety Issue Continues to Occupy Judicial Code Panel’s Attention, 20 LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT, June 16, 2004, at 318, 318 (“‘Appearance of impropriety’ is a ‘softer’ way of characterizing objectionable conduct
than actual impropriety.” (quoting J.J. Gass, Brennan Center for Justice)).
347. McKeown, supra note 202, at 54 –55 (“Refocusing the debate on the
appearance of impropriety relieves pressure on all concerned and serves as a
useful conflict avoidance principle.”).
348. Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice
and the “Search for Truth” in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1292
(1996); see also Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea
Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 n.13 (2002) (sampling the “vast” literature critical of plea-bargaining).
349. See, e.g., Helen C. Robbins, Letter to the Editor, Unfair to Taxpayers,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 28, 2002, at A12 (criticizing a plea negotiation that permitted a Pennsylvania judge to retire and collect disability and
pension benefits); Diane Stanesic, Letter to the Editor, It’s Unfair to Many
Others for Judge McFalls to Get This Deal, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug.
16, 2002, at A16 (same); see also Sheila D. Byers, Letter to the Editor, The
State Has Fired Others for Much Less, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 21,
2002, at A14 (same). But see Editorial, Barred From the Bench McFall’s Resignation is the Best Conclusion, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 27, 2002, at
A18. For a description of the terms of Judge McFalls’s plea agreement, see
Marylynne Pitz, McFalls Cuts a Deal: Collect Disability, Retire, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 14, 2002, at A1.
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The principal function of negotiated criminal dispositions
is to relieve backlogs by facilitating prompt and final resolution
of pending cases.350 Prearranged pleas also (1) eliminate the
“enforced idleness” of confined defendants awaiting trial, (2)
protect the public from persons released on bail who are likely
to continue their criminal ways, and (3) reduce “the time between charge and disposition . . . [thereby enhancing] the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.”351 Prosecutors favor plea bargaining not only
because it reduces court congestion, but also because it assists
in maintaining a high conviction rate.352 Pleas provide a financial advantage to defense attorneys because while a flat fee
may be sufficient to negotiate an agreed disposition, it is usually inadequate to compensate for the time and expense involved
in preparing and trying a case.353
The considerations underpinning the acceptance of plea
bargaining in the criminal realm,354 in the main, are not applicable to disciplinary proceedings instituted against judicial officers. The calendars of judicial disciplinary bodies will not
come to a standstill in the absence of plea bargaining.355 Judges
350. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that plea bargains “serve an important role in the disposition of today’s heavy calendars”); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505,
511 (D.C. Cal. 1975) (“[P]lea bargaining is sanctioned because without it the
system of criminal justice could not function effectively.”); Rise v. Bd. of Parole, 745 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Or. 1987) (noting the “endemic reliance on plea
agreements to manage . . . overloaded criminal dockets”); State v. Lee, 847
P.2d 25, 28 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (“Without such plea bargaining our already
congested judicial system would grind to a virtual halt.”).
351. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
352. Steven P. Grossman, An Honest Approach to Plea Bargaining, 29 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 101, 104 n.17 (2005).
353. Combs, supra note 348, at 23.
354. Plea agreements are often employed to resolve criminal charges
against a judge. See, e.g., Bill Braun, Case Against Judge Dismissed, TULSA
WORLD, June 16, 2009, at A2 (describing the agreement by which a felony
charge against a judge was dismissed in return for “deferred prosecution” on a
misdemeanor charge); Federal Judge Sentenced for Obstruction of Justice,
NAT. L.J., May 18, 2009, at 17 (reporting that a federal judge pled guilty to one
count of obstructing justice in return for the dismissal of five other charges
and a promise by the prosecution not to seek a penitentiary sentence in excess
of three years).
355. The task before many judicial disciplinary bodies, however, is substantial. For example, each year the New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct averages 1440 new complaints, 400 preliminary inquiries, and 200
investigations involving the state’s approximately 3500 judges. N.Y. COMM’N
ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2008). Investigations can also be
expensive. See, e.g., Carri Geer Thevenot, Comments Taken on How State

2010]

THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

1981

who are at risk to reoffend if allowed to remain on the bench
awaiting disposition of the disciplinary charges can be assigned
to administrative duties356 or placed on an interim suspension.357 But even if plea bargained dispositions are appropriate
in some judicial discipline cases, the agreement should be
based upon actualities, not appearances.
At stake in judicial disciplinary proceedings is public confidence in the integrity of the prosecuting authority, the body
charged with determining the judge’s guilt or innocence, the
judge, and the entire judiciary.358 Masking an actual impropriety with a finding or admission of an appearance of wrongdoing
is not only disingenuous, but also defeats the public’s right to
know exactly how their judges are performing.359 Facts, not appearances, are needed to support public trust and to inform citizens preparing to vote for or against the retention of a misbehaving judge.360 The “benefit” of employing appearances as a
plea bargaining tool does not warrant compromising the factfinding process or hindering the public’s ability to learn whethHandles Judicial Complaints, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 16, 2009, at 2B (stating
that the investigative cost of a complaint against Nevada Judge Elizabeth
Halverson reached nearly $78,000).
356. E.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 56 (1990) (amended 2008) (authorizing reassignment of a judge to restricted or nonjudicial duties during the pendency of
disciplinary proceedings).
357. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 9.219 (1985) (amended 2003) (providing for the
interim suspension of a judge under investigation for, or awaiting final adjudication of, a disciplinary complaint); see also In re Shenberg, 632 So. 2d 42, 46
(Fla. 1992) (upholding the temporary suspension of a judge without compensation pending disposition of criminal charges because of the need to protect
public confidence in the judiciary); In re Kirby, 350 N.W.2d 344, 347–48 (Minn.
1984) (finding inherent authority to temporarily suspend a judge pending disposition of disciplinary charges); In re Halverson, 169 P.3d 1161, 1183 (Nev.
2007) (upholding interim suspension of a judge).
358. Cf. United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) (stating
that the prosecution must abide by all terms of a plea-agreement because “[a]t
stake is the honor of the government[,] public confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the efficient administration of justice . . .”).
359. Cf. Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV.
1, 16 (2007) (arguing that using the appearance standard in determining
whether a judge is disqualified from a proceeding “may grease the works in
some way, but it does more harm than good in the end by masking the real
underlying concern about unbiased judging”).
360. See E. Keith Stott, Jr., Confidentiality Rules Change in Arizona, JUD.
CONDUCT REP., Summer 2006, at 1 (“Judges are elected or retained by the voting public. In order to vote responsibly, the public needs information about
judicial disciplinary actions and complaints.” (quoting from a petition filed in
the Arizona Supreme Court by the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office in
2004)).
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er a judge violated a rule or only appeared to do so. An example
of how the disciplinary process can be compromised by a negotiated plea to an appearance of impropriety is presented in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mascio.361
Judge John Mascio was charged with (1) misusing public
funds, (2) manipulating his retirement date and reelection
campaign so as to simultaneously receive a pension and salary
for the same judicial office, (3) jailing a prosecutor for contempt
after disqualifying himself from the case, and (4) distributing
pool party invitations containing the “sophomoric” reference
that “young female attorneys in good physical shape must attend.”362 The Ohio Supreme Court accepted a stipulation and
reprimanded the judge for creating an appearance of impropriety by sending the invitations.363 The court did not set forth
the offending text of the invitations or identify the conduct
charged in the three dismissed counts.364 As a result, the disciplinary order was singularly unhelpful in determining the nature of the charges against the judge, what the judge did or did
not do, the seriousness of the misconduct (or apparent misconduct), the reasons for abandoning three of the four charges, and
the degree of thoroughness accompanying the investigation.
Dismissing the more serious charges in return for a plea of
creating a bad appearance, without some explanation by the
court, does not build public confidence in the judiciary or the
judicial disciplinary system.
As illustrated in In re Livingstone,365 an appearance-based
negotiated plea compromises the disciplinary process even
where the judge resigns as part of the negotiation.366 The Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct charged Judge Livingstone with serious violations of the state’s code of judicial
conduct including (1) knowingly filing a false affidavit in a
361. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mascio, 725 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2000).
362. Mike Lafferty, Judge Faced with Four Count Complaint, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Oct. 15, 1998, at 1C; see also Mike Lafferty, Poor Conduct Could
Result in Reprimand: Mascio Agreed that Sophomoric References in Invitations
to Two Pool Parties Were Demeaning, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 10, 1999, at
5B; Stephen L. Wasby, Legal Notes: Take the Money and Run Right Back to
the Bench: A Double-Dipper’s Success Story, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 89, 100 (1999)
(explaining how Judge Mascio was able to simultaneously receive a pension
and salary).
363. Mascio, 725 N.E.2d at 1111.
364. Id.
365. Livingstone (Mass. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 28, 2008)
(agreed disposition), http://www.mass.gov/cjc/livingstone4162008.pdf.
366. Id.
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small claims case, (2) transmitting a threatening letter to a tenant, (3) improper fee-sharing with a lawyer, (4) claiming personal expenses as business expenses on tax returns, (5) serving
as the manager of a real estate business, and (6) false reporting
to the state judicial conduct commission and state ethics commission.367 An attempt to negotiate an agreed disposition that
would have allowed the judge to remain on the bench was rejected by the state supreme court.368 The court did accept a revised plea agreement that permitted the judge to retire.369 As
part of the agreement, the judge submitted a letter of apology
acknowledging his regret in creating an appearance of impropriety.370 Neither the judge’s apology letter371 nor the court’s
Agreed Disposition Order372 mentioned the false affidavit, the
misrepresentations on tax returns, the false statements to the
state judicial conduct commission and state ethics commission,
or any of the original charges. The Agreed Disposition Order,
including the letter of apology, simply did not give the public a
true picture of the circumstances surrounding the judge’s resignation.
Confronting a similar situation, the Indiana Supreme
Court employed a far superior method of dealing with a resignation in the face of serious allegations of judicial misconduct.
In In re Pfaff,373 the judge was charged with entering a home
searching for his daughter, grabbing and threatening a male at
gunpoint, and stating words to the effect of “[t]his Mother
F_____ better talk or he’s going to die.”374 It was also claimed
that the judge provided false information concerning the incident to a special prosecutor and the state Commission on Judicial Qualifications.375 After a report was issued by three masters assigned to take evidence, the judge resigned his office and
367. Complaint, In re Livingstone Mass. Comm’n on Jud. Conduct (Mass.
Comm’n on Jud. Conduct Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.mass.gov/cjc/livingstone
10222007.pdf.
368. Martin Finucane, Judge Accused of Misconduct Retires: In Apology,
Regrets Business Conflicts, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2008, at 2B.
369. Livingstone (Mass. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 28, 2008)
(agreed disposition), http://www.mass.gov/cjc/livingstone4162008.pdf.
370. Id. attachment B.
371. Id.
372. In the Agreed Disposition, Judge Livingstone “acknowledges that he
has violated certain provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct (SJC Rule
3:09), as described in the Formal Charges . . . .” Id. ¶ 2.
373. 838 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. 2005).
374. Id. at 1024.
375. Id. at 1025.
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issued a letter of apology expressing deep remorse for the negative impact of his actions.376 The Indiana Supreme Court accepted the resignation but also issued an opinion documenting
the circumstances surrounding the resignation including a detailed recitation of the masters’ findings and recommendations.377 The court’s opinion provided the public with complete
information regarding the conduct of one of its judges. This
open, transparent approach to judicial discipline enhances public confidence.378 The face-saving substitution of appearance for
reality does not.379
IV. SOLUTIONS
The deficiencies inherent in the use of the appearance-ofimpropriety as a disciplinary standard can be remedied in one
of three ways. First, the role of the appearance prohibition
could be confined to that of an aspirational goal rather than a
disciplinary rule. Second, the woefully imprecise test could be
replaced with specific rules. Because the first two recommendations are unlikely to receive widespread support, a third proposal is offered—narrowing the appearance standard so that it
applies only to behavior that flagrantly violates professional
norms and either undermines the judicial process, or clearly
compromises the judge’s ability to act with independence, integrity, and impartiality.
A. ELIMINATE THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY AS A
DISCIPLINARY STANDARD
The simplest and most direct approach to curing the problems caused by a rule that subjects judges to discipline for appearing to engage in misconduct without actually doing so is to
eliminate the rule. Jurisdictions adopting the 2007 Code can
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1023–25.
378. See Steven Lubet, When Judges Investigate Judges, CHI. TRIB., June
3, 2004, at 23 (“The [judicial disciplinary] system would work better if there
were more public information about its procedures and especially about the
results of investigations.”); see also Robert H. Tembeckjian, Judicial Discipline
Hearings Should Be Open, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 419, 424 (2007).
379. In In re Sherrill, the North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission
proceeded with a disciplinary action even after the judge resigned. 403 S.E.2d
255 (N.C. 1991). The Commission did so in order to determine if the judge
would lose his pension and be disqualified from holding judicial office in the
future. Id. at 257. The North Carolina Supreme Court’s opinion describes the
judge’s misconduct. Id.
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easily achieve this result by deleting the requirement that a
judge avoid the appearance of impropriety from Rule 1.2 of the
Model Code.380 Because Canon 1 of the Code also contains the
appearance prohibition, it would continue to serve as one of the
“overarching principles of judicial ethics that all judges must
observe.”381 But its function would be hortatory, not disciplinary.382
This suggested solution—deleting the appearance standard
from the disciplinary rule while retaining it in the canon—was
the approach taken by the Joint Commission in its Final Report
to the ABA House of Delegates.383 The Joint Commission was
forced to abandon its recommendation, however, after substantial opposition surfaced.384 And although North Carolina385 and
Oregon386 have removed any mention of the appearance-ofimpropriety from their judicial codes without any apparent
concomitant inability to discipline judges, it is unlikely that
other jurisdictions will follow suit.387 To date, ten states have
revised their codes of judicial conduct in light of the 2007 Model
Code and each has enacted the appearance-of-impropriety prohibition as a disciplinary rule.388
380. Rule 1.2 provides: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007).
381. Id. scope 2.
382. Id. (“[A] judge may be disciplined only for violating a Rule . . . .”).
383. See supra note 120.
384. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
385. See N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2009) (explaining that
the appearance of impropriety standard was removed from the North Carolina
Code in 2003).
386. See OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2002) (explaining that the appearance of impropriety standard was removed from the Oregon Code in
1996).
387. But see WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT, SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE
ON THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT tab 3 (Sept. 2009), available at http://
www.courts.wa.gov/ (enter “Supreme Court Task Force on the Code of Judicial
Conduct” in the search bar; then select the first result) (recommending that
the state supreme court eliminate the appearance of impropriety as a basis for
judicial discipline).
388. ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009); ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009); DEL. JUDGES’ CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2
(2009); HAW. REVISED CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009); IND. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010); KAN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2
(2009); MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009); MONT. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2
(2009); WYO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2009).
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B. REPLACE THE APPEARANCE STANDARD WITH SPECIFIC RULES
Courts, judicial disciplinary bodies, and ethics advisory
committees determine permissible and impermissible behavior
by applying the appearance standard to fact-specific situations.
By doing so, they, in effect, create new rules of judicial conduct.
For example, a court which finds an appearance of impropriety
in the fact that a judge holds a real estate broker’s license389
clearly creates a new rule—a judge may not be a licensed real
estate broker. The finding by a disciplinary commission that a
judge’s spouse’s jury service in a trial before the judge creates
an improper appearance390 establishes a new juror exemption.
A judicial ethics advisory opinion declaring that voting in a
primary creates an appearance of impropriety391 establishes a
prohibition against participation in the nominating process.
But this is a poor method of enacting judicial conduct standards.392 Case-by-case rulemaking simply does not foster uniformity393 or public confidence in the end product.394
The drafting and adoption of rules governing a judge’s
conduct should be a transparent process involving lawyers,
389. See In re DeSaulnier, 279 N.E.2d 296, 309–10 (Mass. 1972) (“There is
no evidence that Judge DeSaulnier has made any use of his broker’s license,
but his possession of the license gives an impression of an improper intention
to engage for others generally in real estate transactions and activities.”); see
also N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 95-100 (1995), http://www
.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/95-100_.pdf (stating that possession of
a real estate license “if not in itself an impropriety, may well give the appearance of an impropriety which the judge should avoid”).
390. See supra Part III.A.2.
391. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
392. Edward C. Brewer, III, Some Thoughts on the Process of Making Ethics Rules, Including How to Make the “Appearance of Impropriety” Disappear,
39 IDAHO L. REV. 321, 333 (2003) (arguing that a regulatory rule made on an
ad hoc basis “will often be of a lesser quality than it would have been had the
[rulemaking authority] given notice to the regulated parties and the public,
received their comments, and reflected on them before promulgating the final
rule”).
393. Neil D. O’Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 62
MARQ. L. REV. 313, 343 (1979) (“[T]he very fact-orientedness of the [case-bycase] approach lends little to the formulation of uniform principles for resolving ethical problems where improper appearances are in contention.”).
394. See Michael Asimow, Interim—Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 748 (1999) (“Public comment can provide both useful information to the agency and enhanced public acceptance of the rule.”); Jeffrey
S. Lubbers & Nancy G. Miller, The APA Procedural Rule Exemption: Looking
for a Way to Clear the Air, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 481 (1992) (recognizing the
advantage of “enhanced legitimacy and public acceptance of rules that comes
from having public participation in the process”).
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judges, professors, the public, and law-related and non-lawrelated organizations. An open rulemaking procedure is essential for several reasons. First, public input is vital because the
entire purpose of a judicial code is to protect public confidence
in the judiciary. Members of courts and judicial disciplinary
bodies are simply not very good at evaluating public sentiment.395 Second, a participatory process allows for a thorough
review of a proposed regulation including its compatibility with
the existing conduct code, and the potential impact of the rule
on public trust. Third, nonadjudicatory-based rulemaking is not
restricted by the factual, legal, and procedural limitations attached to proceedings before a court, disciplinary body, or advisory committee.396 For example, a court examining whether
possession of a real estate broker’s license by a judge creates an
appearance of impropriety cannot consider the propriety of a
judge holding other types of licenses. However, if the issue is
left to a rulemaking rather than an adjudicatory, body, an assessment can be made whether a real estate license prohibition
is warranted and if so whether the prohibition should extend to
medical, nursing, teaching, plumbing, or similar licenses.
Likewise, if the propriety of a judicial spouse’s jury service is
left to a rulemaking committee, the inquiry could be expanded
to consider whether other household members or relatives
should be prohibited from serving on a jury before the judge.
More comprehensive rules would result.
The superiority of the nonadjudicatory rulemaking process
is amply demonstrated by the development of the 2007 Code.
The ABA recruited a diverse and distinguished group of individuals to serve on the Joint Commission and created a sepa395. See State v. Paulucci, No. 04 -12-02625-ID, 2007 WL 858853, at *5
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 23, 2007) (“Lawyers and courts can only guess
at what an ordinary citizen acquainted with the facts might conclude
. . . . Thus, the bar does not know whether the conduct will be deemed to
create the appearance of impropriety until after the Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics or a court reaches that conclusion.”); Victor H. Kramer,
The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243, 264 –65 (1980) (arguing
that attorney disqualification based on appearances is unworkable because
judges do not assess public perception uniformly).
396. One limitation imposed upon judicial ethics advisory committees is
that they are generally prohibited from considering constitutional issues. See,
e.g., Ark. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-02 (2006), http://www
.arkansas.gov/jeac/opinions/advisory_2006_02.pdf (stating that the Arkansas
Advisory Committee is not authorized to address constitutional issues or other
“issues of law”); Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-139 (2006),
http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/ClerkCt/JE139.pdf (same).
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rate panel of experts to serve as advisors.397 The Joint Commission solicited and received hundreds of written comments and
heard oral testimony praising and criticizing multiple drafts of
the new Code.398 The press even took an interest.399 This inclusive, deliberate, and transparent drafting and revision process
substantially increased the cohesiveness, clarity, and utility of
the final product.400
Although the benefits of a deliberative rulemaking procedure are not contested, supporters of the appearance standard
reject the suggestion that the appearance of impropriety should
be replaced by rules identifying specific misconduct citing the
impracticability of listing all prohibited acts.401 But even assuming that all misconduct serious enough to warrant discipline cannot be identified, there is no excuse for failing to use
the rulemaking process to proscribe conduct currently recognized as producing improper appearances.402
397. For a list of the Joint Commission members and advisors, see ABA,
Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Commission Roster, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/roster.html (last visited Apr.
4, 2010).
398. Written comments submitted to, and testimony taken by, the Joint
Commission are available at Comments—Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/
comments.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2010). See Harrison, supra note 108, at 258
(describing the process of drafting the 2007 Code).
399. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
400. See Raymond J. McKoski, Charitable Fund-Raising by Judges: The
Give and Take of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2008 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 769, 795.
401. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (2007); MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt. (1990) (“Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the prescription [against impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety] is necessarily cast in general terms that extend to
conduct by judges that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the
Code.”).
402. For example, it has been suggested that the appearance standard is
needed to prevent judges from “publically drink[ing] a great deal of alcohol before sitting on the bench even if their competence is not impaired.” Letter from
Andrew L. Kaufman, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to Eileen Gallagher,
Judicial Ctr. Counsel, ABA Joint Comm’n (June 9, 2004), available at http://
www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/comm_rules_kaufman_060904.pdf.
If
that is true, a policy requiring abstention during the workday is certainly superior to a case-by-case determination of the amount of alcohol, short of intoxication, which creates an appearance of impropriety. But see JUDICIAL CONDUCT
BD. OF PA., JUDICIAL CONDUCT BOARD POLICY ON JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT INVOLVING SUBSTANCE ABUSE 2 (2003), available at http://www.judicialconduct
boardofpa.org/SubstanceAbusePolicy.pdf (providing that the rule against consuming alcohol or other mood-changing chemicals on court property or while
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The combination of codifying prohibited acts where possible and narrowing the application of the appearance standard,
as suggested in the next section, is at least a step in the right
direction.
C. PLACE A LIMITING CONSTRUCTION ON THE PHRASE
“APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY”
Usually there is no need to rely upon an appearance of
wrongdoing when imposing discipline because the offending
judge has violated another, more specific section of the governing code.403 In the rare case where a reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or other sanction is issued exclusively on the
basis of an appearance of impropriety, cabining the scope of the
phrase may allow it to survive a due process challenge. A proposed limiting construction follows.
The appearance-of-impropriety standard is appropriately
narrowed by applying it only in particularly egregious situations where the judge’s behavior flagrantly violates accepted
norms of the judicial profession.404 The appearance prohibition
should be further limited to conduct which either undermines
the judicial process405 or clearly compromises a judge’s ability
to perform his or her responsibilities with independence, integrity, and impartiality.406
performing judicial duties “does not apply to limited alcohol consumption at
meals off of the court premises”).
403. See notes 268–70 and accompanying text.
404. See In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 498 (N.J. 1982) (limiting the discipline
of attorneys for violating the “appearance of impropriety” standard to situations “involving conduct flagrantly violative of accepted professional norms”);
cf. In re Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (Mass. 1996) (refusing to apply
an attorney disciplinary rule prohibiting conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” unless the conduct is egregious and flagrantly violative of
accepted professional norms); In re Gadbois, 786 A.2d 393, 400 (Vt. 2001)
(adopting the “flagrantly violative of accepted professional norms” limitation
in applying a disciplinary rule prohibiting attorneys from engaging in conduct
which is prejudicial to the administration of justice).
405. See In re Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d at 1098 (construing the attorney
disciplinary standard “prejudicial to the administration of justice” to include
flagrant conduct which “undermine[s] the legitimacy of the judicial
process[es]”); Fla. Bar v. Pettie, 424 So. 2d 734, 737–38 (Fla. 1982) (construing
the phrase “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” to prohibit
acts which undercut the legitimacy of the judicial process).
406. See In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 612 (Pa.1992) (holding that in order to
violate the appearance of impropriety standard the judge’s act must relate to
the judicial function or judicial integrity). Professor Lubet also defines judicial
misconduct in terms of its effect on the judging process:
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In applying this refined appearance-of-impropriety standard, a disciplinary body might consider, among other things,
whether the judge’s conduct (1) misused judicial power or prestige;407 (2) exhibited actual or potential bias or prejudice for or
against a party, potential party, or class of litigants;408 (3) directly impacted a litigant’s rights, the legitimacy of a legal proceeding, or the legitimacy of the judicial system;409 (4) was of a
public or private nature;410 (5) occured in the judge’s official or
unofficial capacity;411 and (6) violated a norm uniformly observed by members of the judiciary.412
I propose that we evaluate the nature of the [judge’s] act in question
with regard to its implications for judging. The proper inquiry is not
whether the act is moral or immoral, or whether it is acceptable or
unacceptable. We need not even ask whether it is criminal or noncriminal. Rather, we must ask how the act reflects upon the central
components of the judge’s ability to do the job for which he or she has
been empowered: fairness, independence and respect for the public.
Steven Lubet, Judicial Impropriety: Love, Friendship, Free Speech, and Other
Intemperate Conduct, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 379, 386 (quoted in Larsen, 616 A.2d
at 581); see also Abramson, supra note 170, at 955 (1996) (“A judge may be
punished for any conduct that legitimately reflects upon the judge’s ability to
act in an official capacity.”); Patrick Donald McCalla, Note, Judicial Disciplining of Federal Judges is Constitutional, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1292–93
(1989) (proposing that disciplinary rules exclude nonjudicial conduct “which
does not affect a judge’s ability to perform official functions”).
407. See supra notes 396–97 and accompanying text; see also In re Murphy,
897 N.E.2d 1220, 1225 (Mass. 2008) (finding a judge’s actions were “a misuse
of the power and prestige of judicial office”).
408. See WIS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT SCR 60.03(1) cmt. (2010) (suggesting that the degree to which the judge’s conduct is indicative of bias or
prejudice be considered in determining whether a judge’s off-bench behavior
violates standards of judicial conduct); Steven Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 983, 995 (1984) (same).
409. Cf. WIS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT SCR 60.03(1) cmt. (2010) (considering the degree to which the judge’s act is protected as an individual right);
Lubet, supra note 408, at 995 (same).
410. WIS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT SCR 60.03(1) cmt. (2010) (listing
“the public or private nature of the conduct” as one of the factors to be balanced in determining whether a judge’s off-bench behavior violates standards
of judicial conduct); Lubet, supra note 408, at 995 (same).
411. See Larsen, 616 A.2d at 581 (restricting application of the appearance
of impropriety standard to “(1) conduct of a judge acting in an official capacity,
(2) any other conduct which affects the judge while acting in an official capacity, and (3) conduct prohibited by law”); cf. In re Ellender, 889 So. 2d 225, 232
(La. 2004) (considering whether the judge’s impropriety took place in the
judge’s official capacity or private life in assessing the seriousness of the
transgression).
412. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 85 F.3d 701,
703–04 (D.C. Cir. Judicial Council 1996) (declaring discipline inappropriate
“where reasonable judges might be uncertain as to whether or not the conduct
is proscribed”); In re Comm’n on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, 916 A.2d 746,
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This suggested construction would not condone, but also
would not punish, purely “oafish,”413 “ill-advised,”414 or “unjudicial”415 conduct. Nor would it discipline behavior creating minor, nonaggravated improper appearances416 or behavior offensive to the personal sensibilities of a segment of society.417
A narrowly tailored appearance standard is most likely to
find application in disciplinary matters based upon out-of-court
conduct. This is not because judges are necessarily better behaved on the bench, but because codes of conduct are replete
with explicit provisions proscribing unprofessional and even socially unacceptable behavior while wearing a robe. For example, a judge whose official behavior is not patient, dignified, or
courteous can be charged with a violation of Rule 2.8(B) of the
2007 Code.418 Similarly, any type of courtroom conduct which
indicates a judicial bias or prejudice is punishable under Rule
2.3 of the 2007 Code, which broadly provides:
A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or
conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race,
sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual

755 (R.I. 2007) (“‘[I]f a reasonably prudent and competent judge would consider that conduct obviously and seriously wrong in all the circumstances,’ the
judge’s action constitutes judicial misconduct.” (quoting In re Benoit, 487 A.2d
1158, 1163 (Me. 1985))).
413. In re Nakoski, 742 A.2d 260, 265 (Pa. Ct. Judicial Discipline 1999).
414. Id.
415. Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 756 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ohio 2001) (restricting application of the appearance of impropriety standard to “conduct
which would appear to an objective observer to be not only unjudicial but prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial office” (quoting In re Kneifl, 351
N.W.2d 693, 695–96 (Neb. 1984))).
416. Some jurisdictions classify an inconsequential violation of a judicial
code provision as a minor transgression not warranting discipline. See MASS.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT S.J.C. R. 3:09 cmt. 3D (2009–10) (describing less
serious code violations); WIS. ADMIN. CODE: JUDICIAL COMM’N § 4.08(4)(d)
(2009) (directing that some allegations of judicial misconduct do not warrant
prosecution because of their “minor nature”); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT scope 6 (2007) (stating that the 2007 Code does not contemplate that every rule violation will result in discipline).
417. In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 582 (Pa. 1992); Abramson, supra note 170,
at 955 (suggesting against disciplining a judge merely because he or she is an
offensive person).
418. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (2007); see also MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) (1990) (“A judge shall be patient,
dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity . . . .”).

1992

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[94:1914

orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation . . . .419

Likewise, any hint that a judge, while performing official
duties, lacks impartiality, practices favoritism, or unfairly restricts a party’s opportunity to be heard, can be charged under
specific code provisions.420 There is simply no need to resort to
an appearance charge for judicial misconduct occurring during
the execution of adjudicatory or administrative duties.
Two types of private, nonjudicial behavior are most likely
to create disciplinary problems for judges—using the prestige of
office for private gain and manifestations of bias or prejudice.
Since codes of conduct contain specific provisions prohibiting a
judge’s misuse of official prestige either on or off the bench,421
there is little need to rely on appearances to sanction a judge
for conduct which expressly or impliedly exploits the judicial
office.422 However, while judicial codes prohibit the manifestation of bias or prejudice in the performance of official duties,423
codes usually contain no specific rule barring displays of bias or
419. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2007); see also MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) (1990) (“A judge shall not, in the
performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice,
including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status
. . . .”).
420. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2007) (“A judge
shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office
fairly and impartially.”); id. R. 2.4(B) (“A judge shall not permit family, social,
political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s
judicial conduct or judgment.”); id. R. 2.6(A) (“A judge shall accord to every
person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the
right to be heard according to law.”).
421. See, e.g., id. R. 1.3 (“A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so.”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1990)
(“A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private
interests of the judge or others . . . .”); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B
(1972) (“He [the judge] should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the
private interests of others . . . .”).
422. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
423. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2007) (“A
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment . . . .”); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) (1990) (“A judge shall perform judicial duties
without bias or prejudice.”). One court has held that Canon 3B(5) prohibits a
judge from exhibiting bias or prejudice in fulfilling adjudicatory duties but
does not bar similar discriminatory manifestations when carrying out administrative or other nonadjudicatory duties. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Boland, 975 So. 2d 882, 895 (Miss. 2008). This interpretation seems
unduly restrictive.
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prejudice during a judge’s nonjudicial endeavors. As a result, a
narrowed construction of the appearance prohibition is most
likely to come into play where unofficial, off-the-bench conduct
indicates a predisposition against a class of persons that may
appear before the judge. This type of conduct is illustrated in In
re Ellender.424
Judge Ellender and his wife attended a private Halloween
party at a restaurant. In addition to party guests, restaurant
staff and a few diners were present. For the occasion, the judge
wore an orange prison jumpsuit, handcuffs, and a black afro
wig. Ms. Ellender was dressed as a police officer. According to
the Ellenders, the costumes intended to convey the humorous
impression that the judge was under his wife’s control. The intended hilarious effect did not immediately materialize so Mr.
and Ms. Ellender applied black makeup to their faces.425 No
one explained precisely how the black face enhanced the notion
that the judge had a domineering spouse.
This type of offensive, extrajudicial behavior, which is not
specifically governed by most judicial codes,426 could be punished under a narrowly constructed appearance of impropriety
standard. The factors identified previously427 certainly weigh
heavily in favor of treating the conduct as both flagrant and
clearly compromising the judge’s ability to discharge official duties fairly and impartially. First, Judge Ellender’s Halloween
costume exhibited potential, if not actual, bias against a race of
individuals appearing before the court as witnesses, jurors,
lawyers, litigants, and victims. Second, the use of black face,
which remains a dehumanizing and anger-provoking symbol of
racial stereotyping,428 added substantially to the appearance of
424. 889 So. 2d 225 (La. 2004).
425. Id. at 227.
426. Judge Ellender’s conduct arguably could fall within the prohibition of
Rule 3.1 of the 2007 Code disallowing participation in any extrajudicial activity which appears to undermine a judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2007). Comment 3 to Rule 3.1
warns that “[d]iscriminatory actions and expressions of bias or prejudice by a
judge, even outside the judge’s official or judicial actions, are likely to appear
to a reasonable person to call into question the judge’s integrity and impartiality.” Id. cmt. 3.
427. See supra notes 404–12 and accompanying text.
428. John Canzano, Some Suffer a Blackout of Good Sense, OREGONIAN,
Nov. 14, 2008, at Sports Section (“[B]lackface was used in performance art
once upon a time to cement and proliferate racist perceptions and stereotypes.
Basically, it was used to shape perception and prejudice about African Americans, and it was wrong then, and it’s wrong now.”); Eric Lipton, Official Had
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prejudice.429 Third, Judge Ellender’s performance took place in
a public restaurant. Finally, and most importantly, the judge’s
conduct violated a norm uniformly observed by members of the
judiciary. While judges might debate whether a professional
norm prohibits a judge from allowing his wife to sit on a jury,430
or whether a norm bars a judge from appointing another
judge’s relative as a trustee,431 the judiciary uniformly considers demonstrations of racial bias or stereotyping as unacceptable,432 detrimental to a judge’s ability to perform judicial duties
fairly,433 and prejudicial to the administration of justice.434 AsControversial Photos Deleted, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at A18
(summarizing the findings of a Congressional Committee’s investigation into
the awarding of the “most original costume” prize at a federal agency’s Halloween party to a person dressed in a prison jumpsuit, a dreadlock wig, and
black face paint); Jeff Shelman, Blackface Skit Shocks NDSU Campus: North
Dakota State Is Latest on a Growing List of Schools to Poke Fun at People of
Color Using Face Paint, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 29, 2008, at B1.
429. The 2007 Code provides examples of conduct that a judge must avoid
in performing judicial duties because the acts evidence prejudice, including
“epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 2 (2007).
430. See supra Part III.A.2.
431. In re Spector, 392 N.E.2d 552, 555 (N.Y. 1979) (admonishing Judge
Spector for creating an appearance of impropriety by appointing other judges’
sons as receivers and referees especially while other judges appointed Judge
Spector’s son to similar positions); see also supra Part III.B.1.c.ii (discussing
the Spector decision).
432. See In re Agresta, 486 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (App. Div. 1985) (“[W]e have
held that it is improper for a judge to make remarks of a racist nature even
when the remarks are made out of court.”); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
R. 3.1 cmt. 3 (2009) (“Discriminatory actions and expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge’s official or judicial actions, are likely to
appear to a reasonable person to call into question the judge’s integrity and
impartiality.”); ALFINI ET AL., supra note 260, § 3.03, at 3-19 to 3-20 (“[T]he
use of racial or ethnic epithets and racially or ethnically stereotypical remarks
is strongly disapproved in modern society . . . .”); Mary Owen, Judge Quits After She Is Accused of Racial Slurs, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 2008, at 16 (reporting
judge’s resignation after receiving a disorderly conduct citation following a
traffic incident in which she allegedly used racial slurs).
433. See In re Ellender, 889 So. 2d 225, 232 (La. 2004) (finding that the
judge’s actions “have caused the public to question his integrity and ability to
be fair to African-Americans and has diminished the integrity and respect citizens hold for Louisiana’s judiciary”); In re Lowery, 999 S.W.2d 639, 656–57
(Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998) (“Judges who freely use racial or other epithets, on or off
the bench, create, at the very least, a public perception that they will not fairly
decide cases involving minorities.”); In re Jensen, (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Performance May 29, 1997) (determination), http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/
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suming that a specific code provision is unavailable to regulate
conduct similar to that exhibited by Judge Ellender, a narrowly
construed appearance-of-impropriety prohibition could fill the
disciplinary void.435
CONCLUSION
Judgments based on appearances are inescapable. However, important decisions, to the extent possible, must be founded
on substance, not shadows. Our legal system is designed to cut
though facades, pretences, and appearances to discover the
truth. We should demand no less of the judicial disciplinary
process.
But even more important than the general proposition that
reality, not appearance, should decide a judge’s fate, is the fact
that appearance-based discipline does not work. It fails from a
constitutional standpoint because the current definition of appearance of impropriety is as hopelessly vague as the first
Model Code’s admonishment to conduct one’s life beyond reproach.
The appearance test also fails on a practical level. In order
to avoid the appearance of impropriety a judge must know what
the prohibition encompasses. The best way to provide this
guidance is to enact rules defining the forbidden conduct. The
second best method is to supply judges with an analytical
Determinations/J/jensen.htm (“Remarks with racial overtones cast doubt on a
judge’s ability to be impartial in all matters that come before the court.”).
434. In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99, 100 (Cal. 1982) (Kaus, J., concurring) (“The
administration of justice is prejudiced by the public perception of racial bias,
whether or not it is translated into the court’s judgments and orders.”); In re
Removal of a Chief Judge, 592 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 1992) (finding that the
judge’s statements embracing and endorsing stereotypes eroded public confidence in the judiciary, cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality, and threatened
the effective functioning of the judiciary). But see In re Nakoski, 742 A.2d 260,
262 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 1999) (refusing to find an appearance of impropriety where a judge in response to a seminar instructor’s question as to
whether it was unlawful or illegal to be black, answered “yes” and further explained that “[t]hey’re all in jail. They’re the ones doing all the robberies and
burglaries.”).
435. See Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Boland, 975 So. 2d 882,
886 (Miss. 2008) (disciplining judge for stating, among other things, that African-Americans in Hinds County could “go to hell for all I care”). The judge
made the remark during a break-out session at a judicial conference. The
judge was found to have violated not only Canon 2 of the Mississippi Code
prohibiting the appearance of impropriety, but also Canon 3C(1), requiring a
judge to diligently discharge administrative responsibilities without bias or
prejudice. Id. at 895–96.
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framework for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable behavior.436 The appearance rule does neither. What remains is a
boundless rule compelling judges and their families to abstain
from protected, society-building activities for fear that a wrong
guess will destroy a judicial career or reputation. Worse yet,
the appearance standard usurps the rulemaking function from
bodies better equipped to establish comprehensive and uniform
rules through a public vetting process.
While the new and improved 2007 Code brings hope to
judges struggling with everyday ethical issues, one unforeseen
consequence of the current Code lurks beneath the surface. The
2007 Code may encourage more appearance-based charges than
preceding Model Codes. This is because both the 1972 and 1990
Codes included the appearance-of-impropriety prohibition only
in the title of Canon 2, not in the actual text of the Canon.
Some prosecutors may have been hesitant to premise a charge
merely on a claimed violation of a canon’s title and therefore
based complaints on the specific rules located in the text of canons. This approach would be expected since, as a general rule
“the title of a statute is not part of the statute.”437 For the same
reason, disciplinary bodies may have been reluctant to rely on
the heading of a canon to impose discipline. But now that the
appearance of impropriety is part of a disciplinary rule, on
equal footing with more specific rules, there is no reason not to
include an appearance charge in every disciplinary complaint.
Similarly, there is no reason not to rely on appearances as the
primary or sole basis of discipline. Hopefully, we are not headed into the cave.
In the final analysis, one conclusion is clear. Whether included in a canon title or disciplinary rule, whether found in
the Judge Landis-inspired 1924 Canons or the modern 2007
Code, the appearance-of-impropriety standard is no standard at
all. It only appears to be a standard.

436. Steven Lubet, The Search for Analysis in Judicial Ethics or Easy Cases Don’t Make Much Law, 66 NEB. L. REV. 430, 435 (1987).
437. Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 531 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995); see also Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519,
528 (1947) (“But headings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text.”); Eileen C. Gallagher, The ABA Revisits the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2005, at 7, 8 (observing that
because the appearance of impropriety provision appeared in the title, but not
in the body of Canon 2, many individuals looked to Canon 2A for enforcement
purposes).

